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ABSTRACT
Adults make many risky decisions daily, such as choosing to drive over the speed 
limit or going outside without previously applying sunscreen. How and why adults make 
such decisions remains relatively unknown and has gained much research attention. 
Traditional models o f decision-making, such as Expected Utility Theory (Bernoulli,
1954) and Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) have proven too simplistic, as 
they do not account for the regular deviations from expected decision-making processes. 
Likewise, models that attempt to categorize individuals as risk seeking and risk-averse do 
not hold up well when decisional-domain is examined (Blais & Weber, 2006). 
Contemporary research has cited many individual factors that influence or interfere with 
decision-making processes, such as age, cognitive abilities, and impulsivity, to name a 
few. What is missing, however, is a comprehensive model that examines domain specific 
risky decision-making processes that are employed across the adult lifespan.
This study examined the moderating effects o f the Domain Specific Risk Taking 
Scale (DOSPERT; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) subscales (perceived risk, attitudes 
toward risk, and expected benefits o f risky behavior) and impulsivity on the established 
relationships among cognitive abilities (general intelligence and numeric ability) and 
risky financial and health related decisions. Participants included younger adults, sampled 
from undergraduate level courses and older adults (55+ years), sampled from adult fitness 
programs. The participants completed a survey packet that included demographic 
questions, measures o f cognitive abilities, trait impulsivity, the DOSPERT
(Weber et al., 2002), and several hypothetical financial and health-related risky decisions. 
Possible moderator effects were examined using hierarchical linear regression.
Males made more risky health and financial decisions than females. Similarly, 
younger adults made more domain-specific risky decisions (health and finance) than 
older adults. There were age and gender differences on all aspects o f risk propensity (risk 
perception, risk taking, and expected benefits). Measures o f risk propensity (risk 
perception, risk taking, and expected benefits of risk) and trait impulsivity did not 
moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities and domain-specific risky decisions. 
Practical and clinical implications are discussed. Additionally, limitations and directions 
for future research are reviewed.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
For several decades, investigators have examined factors that influence individual 
decision-making processes. Traditional models o f decision-making, such as Expected 
Utility Theory (Bernoulli, 1954) and Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
often fail to account for regular deviations from expected decision-making processes. 
Additionally, these models are poor predictors o f risky decision-making and do not take 
into account personal factors that have been shown to significantly influence risky 
decision-making (Rothman & Salovey, 1997; Slovic, 1995). Models which seek to 
conceptualize individuals as risk-seeking or risk-averse have also proven too simplistic, 
as contemporary research suggests that personal factors and decisional domain are 
important determinants o f risky decisions (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Davis, Patte, 
Tweed, & Curtis, 2007; Finucane et al., 2002; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1979; Weber, Blais, & Betz., 2002).
Much research has shown the influence o f a variety o f personal factors on 
decision-making processes. For instance, some research suggests that older and younger 
adults differ in their ability to make decisions, with older adults evidencing less decision­
making competence. Numerous factors have been proposed to account for these age 
related differences, including changes in cognitive abilities (Finucane & Gullion, 2010; 
Lipkus et al., 2001), complexity of the problem for which a decision is required
1
2
(Finucane, Mertz, Slovic, & Schmidt, 2005) and the context o f the decision 
(Finucane et al., 2002). Individual differences in numeric ability may also influence one’s 
ability to make competent decisions, especially if such decisions are dependent upon 
numeric information. If adults are unable to understand the data that is presented among a 
set o f risky decisions, this will lead to confusion and difficulty understanding the inherent 
risk involved in various courses of actions. Some research has examined the direct effect 
o f numeric ability on health-related risky decisions (Lipkus et al., 2001). Individual 
differences in numeric ability also have the potential to interfere with decision-making 
processes in other domains, such as finances.
Research has also consistently reported gender differences in risky decision­
making, wherein males tend to make riskier decisions than females (Byrnes et al., 1999). 
Females, however, may be more likely than males to take risks when there is the potential 
of a positive consequence, such as winning a contest, with little involved cost (Harris, 
Jenkins, & Glaser, 2006). Among the leading explanations for these gender differences is 
that males and females are differentially affected by their own perceptions o f enjoyment 
in the proposed risky behavior, perceptions o f the likelihood of negative consequences, 
and the severity of such consequences (Harris et al., 2006; Hillier & Morrongiello, 1998; 
Weber et al., 2002). Weber et al. (2002) also argue that decisional domain significantly 
influences risk propensity, suggesting that risk tolerance is not a stable trait.
Non-clinical impulsiveness, such as that which is part o f regular personality, also 
affects an individual’s ability to make effective decisions. For instance, research suggests 
that people who are more impulsive, or less disinhibited, are more likely to make poor 
judgment decisions on gambling tasks compared to people with greater impulse control
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(Davis et al., 2007). Although gambling experiments approximate real life conditions of 
risky decision-making, they often fail to measure how invested one is in making an 
accurate decision because the stakes are not real. Some research suggests that issue 
involvement, or the degree to which one is invested or involved in a particular decision, 
affects decision-making processes. For instance, Petty and Cacioppo (1979) found that 
high issue involvement affected the persuasiveness o f messages regarding policy 
changes. Thus, it is possible that such approximated real life situations as the gambling 
tasks are not particularly salient to the individual, which may account for more impulsive 
decision-making. Accordingly, the effects o f impulsivity and issue involvement should be 
assessed across a variety of decisional domains, which may be more or less salient to the 
participant, thus affecting risk decision-making processes.
Statement of the Problem
People make many risky decisions every day. Moreover, the older adult 
population in the U.S. is expected to continue to rise until at least 2050 (Administration 
on Aging, n.d.). Thus, many older adults will be in the position o f making important risky 
life decisions than ever before. Such decisions will not only affect the decision-maker 
him or herself, but also have the potential to impact society. For instance, making poor 
financial or health-related risky decisions may affect family members and potentially the 
health and financial sectors o f society. Contemporary research has examined factors that 
may affect or interfere with older adults’ ability to make competent decisions, such as 
general cognitive abilities, but a holistic model o f factors that influence decision-making 
across the adult lifespan is lacking.
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A wealth o f research regarding risky decision-making suggests that there are 
numerous factors that influence or interfere with one’s ability to make competent risky 
decisions, including personal factors that were previously discussed. Much o f this 
research has isolated individual factors, such as age or gender, and assessed the influence 
on risky decision-making. Consequently, comprehensive models of risky decision­
making that take into account these influential personal factors are needed. Moreover, the 
existing literature does not support traditional models of decision-making that seek to 
categorize decision-makers as either risk-seeking or risk-averse; rather, domain-specific 
perceptions and attitudes about risk as well as expected benefits of engaging in risky 
behavior appear to be influential factors o f risky decisions (Weber et al., 2002). Based on 
the state of the current literature, as well as the noted shortcomings, a holistic model of 
the adult risky decision-making process is required.
Models of Decision-Making
There are several competing theories about the processes in which individuals 
engage while making decisions. Expected Utility Theory posits that individuals make 
decisions by comparing risky choices based on expected utility values (Bernoulli, 1954). 
From this perspective, rational decision makers should choose the option with the 
greatest expected value, where expected value represents the product o f the value o f each 
outcome by the probability o f that outcome occurring. Thus, when people make choices 
that follow certain logical patterns, such as maximizing value, they are said to be 
engaging in the axiomatic approach to decision-making (Stanovich, 2010). This approach 
is concerned with maximization of utility. Therefore, rational decisions should evidence
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consistent and coherent relationships. For instance, one of these relationships is 
transitivity. If you prefer A to B and B to C, then you should prefer A to C. If you do not 
have such a preference, then you have violated rationality. The axiomatic approach to 
decision-making should also make people immune to irrelevant contextual information 
because contextual influence would render decisions unstable, thus reducing their 
maximum utility. Although this simple model makes conceptual sense, a plethora of 
research has shown that people often make irrational decisions as evidenced by 
deviations from this model (Stanovich, 2010).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that Expected Utility Theory does not 
adequately capture the decision-making process when risk is involved because decision 
makers often violate the proposed axioms. Specifically, people are likely to violate 
expected utility decisions in the context of gains when certainty, probability, and 
possibility are considered. For example, Kahneman and Tversky note that when making 
risky decisions, people’s decisions will often violate axiomatic decision-making because 
they will choose an outcome that does not maximize utility when weighing certainty of 
outcomes. For instance, participants were asked to choose between two options in two 
choice sets. Option A stated that they had a .80 probability o f obtaining 4,000 and option 
B stated a 1.0 probability, or certainty, that they would obtain 3,000. Options C yielded a 
.20 probability o f obtaining 4,000 and option D yielded a .25 probability o f obtaining
3,000. In this situation, 80% of participants chose option B, which implied that 
“«ft//(y(3,000) / utility(4,000) > 4/5” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 266). Interestingly 
65% of participants chose option C to option D, which implied a reverse inequality. Thus,
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the participants outweighed estimates that they assumed were certain over those that were 
perceived as less certain, or probable. They call this phenomenon the certainty effect. The 
tendency to overweigh certain estimates violates the expected utility model (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also argue that Expected Utility Theory does not 
accurately capture the decision-making process in the context o f loss. For instance, 
participants were asked to choose between two options in two choice sets. In problem 3’, 
there was a .80 probability of losing 4,000 and a 1.0 probability, or certainty, o f losing
3,000. In this situation, 92% of the participants selected the option with the .80 
probability of losing 4,000 over a sure loss o f 3,000, although there was a lower expected 
value. In Problem 4’, there was a .20 probability of losing 4,000 or a .25 probability of 
losing 3,000. Under these circumstances, the majority o f participants, 58%, switched their 
preference and chose the .25 probability of losing 3,000. Thus, outcomes that are certain 
outweigh outcomes that are uncertain, even if the uncertain outcomes have a greater 
probability o f yielding maximum utility. Thus, participants are more likely to evidence 
risk seeking behavior for a loss that is probable compared to a smaller loss that is certain. 
This phenomenon is referred to as the reflection effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Given the limitations of Expected Utility Theory to account for irrational choices in the 
contexts o f gains and losses, Kahneman and Tversky developed Prospect Theory, which 
is a model of decision-making under risk.
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) theory posits that there are two phases o f choice, 
editing and then evaluation. In the editing phase, the individual will preliminarily
evaluate the various prospects, and this leads to the formation of simpler representations 
o f these prospects. Kahneman and Tversky argue that during the editing phase various 
operations are carried out that convert the probabilities associated with each of the 
various prospects, including coding, combining, simplification, and dominance. 
Additionally, they note that many deviations o f preference, such as those discussed as 
weaknesses o f Expected Utility Theory, occur during the editing phase. Coding, or the 
tendency to perceive outcomes as gains or losses relative to a neutral point o f reference, 
is a key tenet o f this theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Stanovich, 2010). Kahneman 
and Tversky argue that this coding influences people to be risk averse for gains or risk 
seeking for losses.
Another key tenet o f this theory is that wealth or welfare are the carriers o f value, 
rather than final states as suggested in Expected Utility Theory. Thus, value of a decision 
is compared to a given reference point. For example, $100.00 may be interpreted as petty 
cash by one person and a lot o f money by another depending upon their economic assets. 
Value is thus a function of two components: the reference point, or asset position, and the 
degree o f change from the reference point. Based on these tenets, Kahneman and Tversky 
propose that in terms of wealth, the value, or utility, function will normally be concave 
above the reference point and convex below the reference point, indicating that the 
marginal value of gains and losses usually shrink with their magnitude. Finally, prior to 
making a decision, the decision maker must internally multiply the value of each possible 
outcome by a decision weight. Decision weights are subjectively determined from the 
choices and are not probabilities, so they do not have to adhere to probability axioms.
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According to Kahneman and Tversky, decision weights assess the influence o f events on 
the attractiveness o f prospects, rather than the perceived likelihood of the events. For 
example, imagine that someone could win $1,000.00 based on the toss o f a fair coin. For 
most people, the probability o f winning this gamble is .50, but for some people, the 
decision weight ti(.50) that is determined from the choices is likely to be less than .50 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Although Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory provides a better 
account for decision-making under risky conditions, people still have a tendency to 
deviate from the expectations presented within this model. In fact, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) note that decision-makers often violate rationality when making 
decisions and that the frame o f a message is important. Specifically, they argue that 
messages can be framed in terms of relative costs, which are referred to as loss frames, or 
gain frames, which emphasize the benefits o f a given behavior. For instance, the Asian 
disease problem describes an unusual disease that is expected to kill 600 people. The 
participant is asked to select between two programs to implement, both of which will 
save some lives, but not all. The loss frame presents the program in terms o f how many 
lives will be lost, while the gain frame presents the program in terms of how many lives 
will be saved. Tversky and Kahneman found that when presented with a gain frame, 
participants consistently prefer the option that yields a certain gain and less risk, such as 
200 lives saved, versus the risky prospect o f equal expected value, such as a 1/3 chance 
that all 600 people will be saved and a 2/3 chance that no one will survive.
Comparatively, when programs are framed in terms o f losses, participants show a
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reversal and prefer the risky choice frame (e.g. 1/3 chance that no one will die and a 2/3 
chance that everyone will die) rather than the certain loss frame (e.g. 400 people will die). 
Consequently, those people who choose gain frames are often risk averse, while those 
who choose loss frames are often risk seeking. Such framing problems can be based on 
acts, contingencies, and outcomes. These findings suggest that the fame, or way in which 
the information is presented, affects the way in which the information is understood and 
consequently affects decisional outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In a review of 
message framing research, Mahoney, Buboltz, and Levin (2011) suggest that framing 
effects have been examined in the areas o f consumer behavior, political advocacy, and 
health-related behavior. Thus, framing effects are not domain-specific.
Rothman and Salovey (1997) have also analyzed the influence o f message frame 
on risky choice decisions. They note that framing effects influence risky choice even 
when these messages describe equivalent outcomes, such as those previously described 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1981). Rothman and Salovey suggest that there are three 
stages in the decision-making process for loss and gain framed messages, which will 
determine whether an individual responds to a risky choice in a manner consistent with 
the decision-making process proposed by Prospect Theory. First, mental representations 
o f the issue are dependent upon the amount o f attention directed towards the message. 
Messages can be processed systematically, where one attends to the details o f the 
message, or by using heuristics, where one attends to the surface details o f the message. 
They argue that systematic processing is likely to lead to the integration o f the relevant 
information into one’s mental representation of the larger issue. Moreover, interest in an
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issue is likely to activate systematic processing and research suggests that personal 
involvement moderates the relationship between message framing and health behavior 
(Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990; Rothman & Salovey, 1997).
Next, experience and one’s current life situation are important influential factors 
in the receptivity of the message and represent the second stage in the decision-making 
process (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Rothman and Salovey (1997) suggest that mood, 
disposition, knowledge, and life experience will influence an individual’s willingness to 
adopt a given healthy behavior. Specifically, they argue that one’s mood may influence 
the accessibility o f mood-congruent information, which may affect whether a message is 
processed as mood-congruent. For instance, they note that a sad mood may highlight the 
potential o f incurring loss, whereas a happy mood may highlight the potential o f gain. 
Additionally, optimists may be more responsive to gain frames, whereas pessimists may 
be more responsive to loss frames. Rothman and Salovey also argue that research 
suggests that those health related messages that are personally relevant may lead to 
counterarguments among recipients. Comparatively, messages about health risks that are 
not personally relevant are less likely to elicit such counterarguments and thus have a 
lessened effect on risky choice.
Finally, the function o f the behavior presented in the message frame, such as 
prevention, detection, or recuperative, is going to influence one’s actual behavior. This 
influence represents Rothman and Salovey’s (1997) third stage in the decision-making 
process for risky choice decisions. They argue that the decision-makers’ beliefs about the 
effectiveness o f the behavior as well as their ability to successfully perform that behavior
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will affect whether or not they actually carry out a recommended behavior. Rothman and 
Salovey report that research supports the notion that self-efficacy is a strong determinant 
of behavior.
Collectively, research regarding models of decision-making suggests that when 
making risky decisions, people often violate expected rational decision-making 
processes, such as those suggested by Expected Utility Theory. For instance, research on 
the influence o f decisional context has shown that decisional consistency varies across 
ages. For example, Slovic (1995) found that younger adults exhibit less consistent 
decision-making as a function of constructive processes that are influenced by decisional 
context. Likewise, Finucane et al. (2002) report that there is strong evidence supporting 
the notion that age-related changes in working-memory affect the judgmental heuristics 
that are used and render older adults more susceptible to being influenced by the 
decisional context. Based on these findings, it is possible that judgmental heuristics are 
differentially used by older and younger adults, highlighting an important deviation from 
models of decision-making. Rothman and Salovey (1997) also suggest that a variety of 
personal factors, including attention, personal involvement, experience, life situation, and 
contextual information are highly influential when making risky decisions. Accordingly, 
future research should seek to determine models o f risky decision-making that examine 
the influence of a variety o f personal factors such as those discussed by Rothman and 
Salovey as well as the context o f the decision. Such a model may yield more predictive 
power and stronger explanations of how individuals make risky decisions.
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Decisional Heuristics
Research has consistently shown that people use heuristics, or mental shortcuts, 
when making decisions (Finucane et al., 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It has been 
suggested that individuals engage such heuristics because they lack the mental capacity to 
process all of the necessary information in a timely manner. Thus, heuristics are 
evolutionarily adaptive strategies that allow people to process some information quickly 
and make a decision. However, the increased speed comes at the cost of reduced accuracy 
(Finucane et al., 2002). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argue that there are three 
commonly used heuristics that help people make decisions regarding probabilities and 
predicted values: Representativeness, Availability, and Adjustment and Anchoring 
heuristics.
The Representativeness heuristic is commonly used to help estimate probabilities 
based on how much one item or condition resembles another item or condition. For 
instance, “what is the probability that object A belongs to class B? What is the probability 
that event A originates from process B? What is the probability that process B will 
generate event A?” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) argue that there are several ways that the Representativeness heuristic interferes 
with an individual’s ability to use probability information. For instance, their research has 
shown that base rates, or prior probabilities, have little effect on estimates o f probability. 
Thus, individuals consistently fail to use base rate information when evaluating 
representativeness and making estimates o f probability. Similarly, people are often 
impervious to sample size when making judgments about the similarity of a sample
statistic to the larger population. Even when sample size is stressed, people continually 
make this error. People also misperceive the occurrence of chance events. For instance, 
Tversky and Kahneman report that people are more likely to consider the results o f a coin 
toss to be T-H-T-H-H-T, rather than T-T-T-H-H-H, as the second sequence does not 
appear random. In this example, they argue that people expect the properties o f the 
process to be represented more fairly. Additionally, chance is often conceived o f as a 
self-correcting process, where the occurrence of one deviation will be corrected by the 
occurrence of the other deviation on the subsequent trial. In this example, there is a 50/50 
chance o f having either a heads or tails turn up on any given toss and participants believe 
that if it turns up heads on the first toss that the process should re-establish equilibrium by 
having a tails on the second toss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
The Availability heuristic may be used to help individuals estimate the frequency, 
category, or probability o f an event based on how easily similar instances or occurrences 
come to mind. The underlying assumption of this heuristic is that more frequently 
encountered or probable examples o f a class or group will be amassed more quickly and 
with less effort than rare examples. The payoff o f using this heuristic, however, is that the 
ease with which examples are retrieved may bias one’s estimates of frequency or 
probability leading to overestimates (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Additionally, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) argue that salience may affect retrievability, thus biasing estimates 
o f frequency or probability. For instance, they suggest that estimates o f probability are 
likely to be influenced by personal experience or encounters with an event opposed to no 
such experience or encounter. Likewise, recently encountered events or objects are more
easily retrievable than events or objects encountered in the past. People may also make 
errors o f frequency or probability based on the use o f faulty search sets. Finally, 
availability o f information regularly leads people to make illusory correlations about 
events due to overestimates o f the frequency of co-occurrence of two events (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).
Finally, many people make errors of adjustment when using initial starting points, 
where the adjustments are often insufficient. This type o f error is known as the 
Adjustment and Anchoring heuristic. Anchoring refers to estimates that are made based 
upon the initial starting point, as various starting points will lead to different estimates. In 
order to make quick decisions, people often only engage a few mathematical 
computations when making estimates that usually lead to underestimates (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) had participants estimate 
the number o f African countries in the United Nations in the form o f percentages from 
zero to 100. Initially, the participant spun a wheel o f fortune and then had to indicate 
whether the estimated percentage was higher or lower than the number displayed on the 
wheel. Additionally, they had to estimate the quantity by which they would have to 
increase or decrease the percentage. They found that those participants who spun a lower 
number tended to estimate lower numbers, while those who spun a higher number 
estimated higher numbers. They also report that payoffs for correct guesses did not 
reduce this anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Taken together, these heuristic models suggest that people do not make decisions 
in a consistent fashion. Moreover, there is research to suggest that people are susceptible
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to making bad decisions, even when they try to avoid erroneous decision-making 
processes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Stanovich, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Indeed, there are many factors that influence the decision-making process. Finucane et al. 
(2002) suggest that there are five basic abilities that are required for good decision­
making, including the ability to comprehend and recall pertinent information, organize 
the various facets of a decision and choices, understand the personal significance o f the 
information, control or overcome impulsivity, and appropriately combine and consider all 
of the information. Some of these abilities will be explored further.
Risk Taking and Decision-Making
Traditional models o f decision-making have attempted to capture the risky 
decisional process, but they have several shortcomings. Specifically, these models have 
been relatively simplistic and cannot explain regular deviations from proposed rational 
decisional processes (Stanovich, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1979). Byrnes et al. (1999) 
argue that there are three major theoretical categories o f risky decision-making (Lopes,
1987). The first category seeks to examine the differences between those people who take 
risks and those who do not. Thus, these theories conceptualize people as risk-seeking or 
risk-averse. The second category examines contextual differences that promote risk 
taking or risk aversion. Finally, the last category seeks to explain both individual 
differences and situational differences in risky decision-making. Accordingly, such 
theories seek to explain why certain people take risks in specific situations. Previous 
research also suggests that several factors influence risky decision-making. Some 
investigators argue that personal factors, such as age, gender, cognitive ability, and
personality traits are influential in risky decision-making (Finucane et al., 2002; Byrnes et 
al., 1999; Li, Baldassi, Johnson, & Weber, 2013; Davis et al., 2007), whereas others 
argue that decisional domain is influential in making such decisions (Hanoch, Johnson, & 
Wilke, 2006; Weber et al., 2002).
Personal Factors Related to Decision-Making
Research suggests that there are relationships among demographic variables - 
specifically age and gender - and decision-making (Bymes et al., 1999; Chamess & 
Gneezy, 2012; Finucane et al., 2002; Li, et al., 2013; Slovic, 1995). For instance, younger 
and older adults may vary considerably on the ways in which they make decisions as well 
as their decisional consistency (Finucane et al., 2002; Slovic, 1995). Specifically, 
Finucane et al. (2002) note that age-related cognitive changes in processing speed and 
memory may lead older adults to depend on simpler decision-making strategies, which 
could lead to a discrepancy in decision-making responses to identical questions framed 
differently. In fact, Finucane et al. (2005) found that older adults are more susceptible to 
framing effects compared to younger adults. Despite these differences, Finucane et al. 
warn investigators against interpreting such results as indicative o f underlying biological 
differences and suggest considering other alternatives, such as education or motivation, to 
name a few. Accordingly, future research should seek to examine the influence of other, 
personal factors such as age-related changes in information processing styles that may 
affect decision-making. Research has also consistently found that males are more prone 
to risky decisions compared to females (Bymes et al., 1999; Chamess & Gneezy, 2012);
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however, this research has not examined gender differences in risky decisions made 
across various decisional domains.
Decision-making competence of younger and older adults. Decision-making 
competence generally refers to two things. First, whether an individual is capable of 
making important life decisions. Secondly, and more generally, however, the term refers 
to whether competence is a function of age, and more specifically, if  older and younger 
adults differ in their ability to make good decisions (Finucane et al., 2002). Research on 
age-related changes in decision-making abilities are mixed, with some investigators 
reporting that older adults make less accurate decisions, while others argue that older 
adults make equally or more accurate decisions than younger adults (Li et al., 2013). 
These differences in decision-making ability have been interpreted in various ways, but 
what is clear, is that further investigation into these differences are required.
Finucane et al. (2002) compared comprehension and consistency abilities of 
younger and older adults. Participants were required to make decisions in the three 
decisional domains of health, finance, and nutrition. Participants were provided with 
information regarding several Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) in tabular 
format and asked various literal and inferential questions about the information in order 
to assess general comprehension. The answers were presented in multiple-choice format. 
The investigators found that the older adults made significantly more errors than the 
younger adults, with the largest differences resulting from inferential questions. These 
findings suggest that older adults are more sensitive to the format o f information and then 
such formats become more complex, comprehension suffers (Finucane et al., 2002).
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Finucane et al. (2002) also assessed judgment consistency with respect to values 
assigned to several dimensions o f the health care plans of the various HMOs. In this task, 
participants were presented with two hypothetical HMO plans, each with two pieces of 
information. Participants first evaluated each plan separately and then were presented 
side by side. For one problem, the investigators found both older and younger adults 
evidenced a preference reversal, where one plan was more attractive than the other when 
presented separately but when presented together, the opposite plan was judged as more 
attractive. Thus, the context of information significantly affected the participants’ 
judgments o f attractiveness. Likewise, both groups o f participants showed a 
strengthening of preference for one set of HMO plans when presented jointly compared 
to individually generated preference ratings. These findings are consistent with Hsee’s 
(1996) evaluability hypothesis, where judgment consistency will arguably suffer when 
information is presented within a context o f comparison, thus allowing for alterations in 
the relative value assigned to options when additional, meaningful information is 
presented (Finucane et al., 2002).
Finucane et al. (2002) also asked participants to report their preferences for 
delegation and decision-making style. They found that older adults reported a stronger 
preference for delegating the responsibility of choosing their health care plan, whereas 
younger adults showed a significantly lower preference for delegation. Likewise, older 
adults perceived themselves as less rational-vigilant in their decision-making compared to 
younger adults. Older adults also reported significantly less skill in using information 
presented in tables and charts than younger adults. In a final analysis, Finucane et al.
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found that age accounted for approximately five percent o f the variance associated with 
performance on these tasks. Taken together, these findings suggest that informational 
context and decisional complexity significantly affect older adults’ ability to make 
competent decisions. Furthermore, older adults may recognize the increased difficulty 
associated with making competent decisions, which may lead them to delegate important 
decisions to others. A limitation of this study, however, was that decisional importance 
was not assessed. It is possible that decisions that are deemed more important by the 
individual will lead to increased effort or desire to make competent decisions for oneself. 
Additionally, it is unclear whether older adults are actually less accurate at making such 
decisions, or if  they are more realistic about their abilities to use various types o f data 
when making decisions.
Bruine de Bruin, Parker, and Fischhoff (2007) report that age does not negatively 
affect older adults’ ability to make competent decisions across all domains. Specifically, 
they found that, compared to younger adults, older adults performed better on tasks 
associated with recognizing social norms and resistance to sunk costs. They argue that 
this may reflect the fact that older adults have more knowledge and life experiences, 
which can assist them in making certain types o f decisions. Furthermore, this lifetime 
knowledge may counter the effects o f age-related changes to general cognitive abilities 
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Li et al. (2013) suggest that there are multiple pathways to 
optimal decisions and these pathways may depend on various forms of intelligence. 
Specifically, they argue that crystallized intelligence taps one’s accumulated knowledge 
gained through experience, while fluid intelligence captures one’s ability to generate,
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transform, and manipulate information. Moreover, Li et al. note that crystallized 
intelligence appears to increase with age, plateauing around 60 years o f age, while fluid 
intelligence diminishes slowly starting in one’s twenties. Accordingly, age-related 
changes in intelligence and cognitive abilities may explain age-related differences in 
decision-making abilities.
Li et al. (2013) argue that older adult’s stable crystallized intelligence may 
provide an alternative route to good decisions, fully or partially making up for lower fluid 
intelligence. They have referred to this as the complementary capabilities hypothesis 
(CCH). Based on this model, decision quality depends on age as well as the relative 
influence of crystallized and fluid intelligence. Li et al. tested this hypothesis in a sample 
o f 173 younger adults, aged 18 to 29 years, and 163 older adults, aged 60 to 82 years. 
Using structural equation modeling (SEM), they assessed whether older and younger 
adults differed on types of intelligence and five decision-making traits: temporal 
discounting, loss aversion, financial literacy, debt literacy, and anchoring. Temporal 
discounting measured the participant’s decision to receive immediate or delayed gifts 
taking into consideration an annual discounting factor. For example, would you prefer to 
receive a $60 gift certificate today or a $75 gift certificate in three months? Loss aversion 
assessed the participant’s sensitivity to fixed and varied losses in a number o f binary 
gambles. Financial literacy measured the participant’s knowledge o f essential economic 
concepts, while debt literacy assessed understanding of compound interest and credit card 
debt. Finally, anchoring examined numerical estimations based on various levels of 
anchor points (Li et al., 2013).
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Li et al. (2013) found that the older adults performed equal to or better than the 
younger adults on these measures of decision-making and that participant age and type of 
intelligence partially explained differences in performance. Specifically, SEM provided 
evidence for the CCH effects on temporal discounting, financial literacy, and debt 
literacy. For financial literacy, direct effects of age were found, while for debt literacy 
age effects were exaggerated after controlling for types o f intelligence. Li et al. note that 
these findings suggest that there is a component o f the decision-making process that was 
not captured by this cognitive model, such as domain-specific knowledge. Furthermore, 
they argue that future research should seek to examine the influence o f cognitive abilities 
and domain-specific knowledge on older and younger adults’ decisions.
Taken together, these findings suggest that there are some age-related differences 
in decision-making, where some tasks may be more difficult for older compared to 
younger adults. Comparatively, tasks that require the use of crystallized knowledge may 
be easier for older adults, as they generally have more crystallized knowledge than 
younger adults do. These findings also suggest that contextual factors play an important 
role in decision-making. Research also suggests that older and younger adults may use 
different types o f intelligence, and consequently, different pathways to optimal decision­
making. What is less clear, however, are how other personal factors, such as personality 
characteristics affect decision-making abilities. Furthermore, these studies did not 
examine age-related differences in risky decisions, which likely require more thorough, 
deliberate decisional processes.
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G ender differences in risky decision-making. Research has consistently found 
that men possess a greater propensity to take risks compared to women (Bymes et al., 
1999; Wilson & Daly, 1985). Bymes et al. (1999) conducted a meta-analysis on 150 
studies that compared risk taking tendencies o f males and females. The studies were 
categorized into three groups based on the type of task employed by the investigators: 
hypothetical choice, self-reported behavior, and observed behavior. Hypothetical choice 
tasks were those where the participants were asked to pick one of two imaginary options 
or choose a tolerable level of risk for a given hypothetical situation. Self-reported 
behavior tasks were those where the participant reported the frequency o f engaging in 
various types of risky behaviors. Finally, observed behavior tasks had participants engage 
in various behaviors that were judged to have some degree of inherent risk and an 
observer-recorded behavior. The studies were further categorized based on task content. 
Three categories emerged for hypothetical choices, which included choice dilemma tasks, 
framing tasks, and other, which consisted o f all other studies that did not fall into either 
o f the previous categories. For the self-reported behavior tasks, five categories emerged 
and included drinking and drugs, driving, sexual activities, smoking, and other. Eight 
content categories emerged in the observed behavior studies: informed guessing, physical 
activity, driving, physical skills, gambling, risky experiments, intellectual risk taking, and 
other. Bymes et al. also categorized all tasks based on ambiguity, where tasks were either 
ambiguous or unambiguous. Finally, the studies were coded based on age of the 
participants, year of publication, and type o f publication.
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Bymes et al. (1999) found that across 150 studies that examined gender 
differences in various types of risk taking behaviors, males were more likely to take risks 
than females. Moreover, they found that gender differences in risky behavior were also 
related to the participant’s age and the context o f the risk. Results indicated that some 
tasks revealed significant gender differences based on the age o f the participants. For 
instance, older participants evidenced greater gender differences in driving behavior than 
younger participants. Comparatively, some tasks were associated with smaller gender 
differences across all age groups, such as smoking. Interestingly, some behaviors (i.e. 
sexual activities) had greater gender differences for younger versus older participants, 
representing age-related shifts in perceptions of inherent risk (Bymes et al., 1999). These 
findings provide further evidence in favor o f the argument that individuals may possess 
different attitudes towards risky behavior depending upon the context in which the 
behavior is situated. Furthermore, these findings suggest that as people age, the relative 
importance, or riskiness of various behavioral domains may change. Thus, risk propensity 
and tolerance may be more dynamic than previously thought.
A fundamental problem with these studies relates to the methods used to measure 
risk taking behavior and decisions. As Bymes et al. (1999) note, there are numerous 
definitions of risk taking and most definitions involve factors such as goals, options, 
outcomes, and values. Accordingly, variations in operational definitions o f risk taking 
affect the ways in which risky behavior and decisional processes are measured. Broad 
definitions of risk taking conceptualize risk as involving the selection and application of 
alternatives that could lead to negative or undesirable outcomes. Such definitions allow
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for the inclusion of various kinds o f risky behavior, including those that may seem 
innocuous, such as raising one’s hand in class, to those that are considered dangerous, 
such as engaging in unprotected sex. Comparatively, narrow definitions generally reduce 
the inclusion of innocuous behaviors (Bymes et al., 1999).
Chamess and Gneezy (2012) note that there is extensive variation among the 
measures used to examine risk taking behavior, thus making cross-experimental 
comparisons difficult. In order to address this weakness, Chamess and Gneezy compared 
the results o f several studies conducted by various investigators that all used the same 
measure of risk taking. Specifically, participants were given an amount o f money, $X, 
and asked to report how much money they would like to invest in a risky investment 
option, $x, and how much they would like to keep. The amount of money that is invested 
is subject to a dividend, $kx (k> 1 ), with a probability o f p  and is lost with probability 1 -  
p. Thus, the payoffs o f these investments are $(X -  x  + Ax) with probability p, and $(X -  
x) with 1 - p  (Chamess & Gneezy, 2012). In this investment game, k and p  are set, such 
that the product of them is greater than one, which renders the expected value of 
investing greater than that of not investing. Accordingly, the choice o f $x, or the amount 
to invest, is the only decision that the participant makes. Risk-seeking participants are 
expected to invest more money, while risk averse participants are expected to invest less 
(Chamess & Gneezy, 2012).
Chamess and Gneezy (2012) found that across all studies, which were conducted 
by different investigators and subject to vast environmental differences, consistent gender 
differences on this task were reported. Specifically, men invested more money than
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women, indicating that on this investment task, men were more risk-seeking than women. 
Based on these findings, Chamess and Gneezy conclude that women make smaller 
investments in risk assets than men, suggesting general gender differences in financial 
risk taking decisions and behavior. One important limitation o f this study is that only one 
domain of risk taking and decision-making was considered: financial. It is not clear 
whether there are more general gender differences in risky decisions and risk taking 
behavior. Accordingly, future research should seek to examine gender differences in 
risky decision-making across a variety o f domains.
Given these consistent gender differences in risk taking behavior, investigators 
are examining possible factors that may lead males and females to evaluate risk 
differently. Hillier and Morrongiello (1998) proposed that school-age males and females 
may differ in their appraisals of risk as well as their beliefs regarding their vulnerability 
to personal injury. In this study, school-aged children, ages 6 - 1 0  years, were shown 
pairs o f photographs, one depicting an unsafe situation and the other depicting a safe 
situation for which they had to make decisions about vulnerability to injury, severity of 
injury, and overall relative and absolute riskiness. There were three situations: stairs, 
bicycle, and playground, which varied on level o f risk: no-risk, low-risk, medium-risk, 
and high-risk.
Hillier and Morrongiello (1998) found that girls rated the various situations as 
riskier than the boys, but found no gender differences for relative risk judgments. They 
also found gender differences in the most significant predictor of absolute risk ratings. 
Girls’ rating o f the vulnerability to injury was the most significant predictor o f absolute
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risk ratings, whereas boys’ rating of severity of injury was the most significant predictor 
o f absolute risk ratings. Therefore, when making judgments o f risk, girls seem to 
question, “Will I get hurt”, whereas boys wonder, “How will I get hurt” (Hillier & 
Morrongiello, 1998, p. 235). Accordingly, they argue that such differences may translate 
into different approaches to risk taking behavior, where girls may be more likely to avoid 
taking risks when they perceive themselves as vulnerable to injury, whereas boys may 
engage in such risky behavior if  they do not perceive possible injuries to be severe. 
Likewise, girls may be more likely to learn to avoid certain risk taking behaviors if  they 
have previously resulted in minor injury, whereas boys may not be deterred from acting if 
they have obtained minor injuries in the past.
Interestingly, Hillier and Morrongiello (1998) did not find significant gender 
differences in the children’s ability to identify hazards across the various scenarios, 
suggesting that boys and girls differentially process injury-related cues, thus leading them 
to make different decisions about engaging in risky activities. Also interesting, the 
investigators did not find age differences in perceptions o f overall risk, although there 
were age differences in perceived vulnerability to risk. They suggest that children 
perceive the same degree of injury severity across ages and that despite age-related 
reductions in ratings o f perceived vulnerability to injury, overall risk perceptions remain 
stable across age. Younger children were slower to rate a situation as risky, which has 
much practical significance. Specifically, faster identification of potential risk allows 
greater precautionary measures to be taken, thus slower risk assessments may render 
younger children more vulnerable to actual risks. Collectively, these findings suggest that
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males and females may differentially evaluate and weigh various cues o f risk, leading to 
gender differences in risky behavior and decision-making. It is possible that these gender 
differences in cue perception and evaluation are stable, which could explain the 
consistent findings of gender differences in risky decision-making and behavior across all 
ages.
Given the abundance of literature that supports the notion of gender differences in 
risky decision-making, a new line o f research seeks to investigate gender differences in 
risky decision-making across various decisional domains, such as financial, recreational, 
and social, to name a few. Weber et al. (2002) argue that gender differences in risk 
perception may vary by content domain in which the decision is to be made, suggesting 
that gender differences may be the result of domain-specific differences in perceived risk 
attitude. Accordingly, these investigators created the Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude 
Scale (DOSPERT), which measures risk perception and behavior across five domains: 
social, financial, recreational, health/safety, and ethics. They found that in a sample of 
560 adults (307 women and 253 men), males and females significantly differed in their 
risk perception scores across all domains except for social, where women perceived the 
risks to be greater, although this difference was not statistically significant. Similarly, 
males and females reported differences in risk taking behavior across these domains 
except for social, wherein males reported that they were more likely to take risks in all 
domains. Interestingly, Weber et al. also found that at the level of the individual 
participant, risk attitude was not consistent across all domains, where no one was 
consistently risk-averse across all domains, and only a small number (four participants)
were consistently risk-seeking across all domains. Accordingly, these findings suggest 
that males and females differ in their perceptions o f risk as well as their risk taking 
behavior; however, these differences do not necessarily suggest that males are risk- 
seeking in all decisional domains and females are risk-averse in all domains. Rather, 
these findings suggest that there are stable gender differences but that content domain is 
an important determinant in both risk perception and risk taking behavior.
Similarly, Harris et al. (2006) found consistent gender differences in risk 
perception across four domains: gambling, health, recreational, and social decisions. For 
each type o f scenario, the participants rated their perceptions o f the probability of 
negative consequences, the likelihood of engaging in the risky behavior, the severity of 
the perceived negative consequences, and perceived enjoyment from engaging in each 
behavior. Compared to women, men reported significantly greater likelihoods of 
engaging in a variety o f risky behaviors in the gambling, health, and recreational 
domains. Across these three domains, women judged the probability of negative 
consequences as more likely and the severity o f these consequences to be greater in the 
gambling and health domains. Males reported greater perceived enjoyment in these risky 
behaviors across all domains compared to females. In the social domain however, males 
and females did not significantly differ in the reported probability o f engaging in the 
risky behaviors, nor were there differences in perceived negative consequences or ratings 
of enjoyment of such activities. Comparatively, women rated the severity o f possible 
consequences as greater for all behaviors in the social domain compared to men. 
Mediation analysis found that perceptions o f negative consequences and perceived
29
enjoyment of engaging in the risk behavior partially mediated the gender differences in 
reported probability of engaging in the risky behavior. For the gambling and health 
domains, severity o f the possible negative consequences was also a significant partial 
mediator o f the likelihood o f engaging in these risky behaviors. These findings dovetail 
those of Weber et al. (2002) and suggest that males and females may be differentially 
affected by perceptions o f the likelihood of negative consequences, severity of these 
consequences, and perceived enjoyment of the behavior while making risky decisions 
across a variety of domains.
Harris et al. (2006) also examined positive risky behaviors, which were those with 
a small potential for substantial gain with a limited certain cost. An example of such a 
behavior includes calling into a radio contest or purchasing a lottery ticket. For these 
types of risky behaviors, women reported being more likely to engage in risky behaviors 
and perceived greater probabilities of positive outcomes compared to men. Accordingly, 
when there is no severe risk of negative consequences and instead a potential to gain 
positive outcomes, women are more likely than men to engage in risky behaviors. 
Mediation analysis suggests that women are more likely to judge the possible positive 
consequences as more likely to occur and they judge these consequences as more 
influential than men. These findings suggest that when making risky decisions, men and 
women differentially use probabilities o f negative and positive consequences, where 
women appear to be more averse to negative possible consequences.
Accordingly, the research on domain-specific risk taking propensity and behavior 
suggest that there are stable gender differences, with males being more likely to engage
in risky behavior with possible negative outcomes. This line o f research also suggests that 
males are not necessarily risk-seeking and females risk-averse; rather, risk taking 
behavior is largely influenced by the decisional domain. Moreover, men and women 
appear to use different domain-specific assessments of the probability o f positive or 
negative consequences and beliefs about the severity of such consequences when making 
risky decisions. The next logical step in this line o f research is to investigate age, or 
generational differences in risk-propensity and risk taking behavior. Furthermore, such 
research may seek to examine age by gender differences, which will further illuminate 
risky decision-making processes.
Impulsivity and Decision-Making
In general, impulsivity refers to the tendency to act without much forethought, 
which may lead to reckless or risky behavior (Davis et al., 2007). Eysenck and Eysenck 
(1978) proposed that impulsiveness relates to two personality dimensions: extraversion 
and psychoticism. Accordingly, they argue that venturesomeness, or a disposition to act, 
regardless o f knowledge of the risk involved in the behavior, is related to extraversion. 
Comparatively, impulsiveness, or one’s inclination to engage in a behavior without much 
forethought and failure to recognize the inherent risk in such behavior, relates to 
psychoticism. From this perspective, it is possible that individual differences in 
personality and impulsiveness will relate to differences in behavior, including one’s 
tendency to engage in risky behaviors. Furthermore, impulsivity may play a critical role 
in decision-making, especially when considering risky decisions.
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Previous research suggests that impulsivity is a multidimensional construct 
(White et al., 1994); however, investigators disagree on which factors characterize 
impulsivity (Miller, Joseph, & Tudway, 2004). Miller et al. (2004) examined the 
component structure o f four widely used self-report measures o f impulsivity, which 
included the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11 (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), 
the Eysenck Impulsivity Inventory (IVE); also called the Impulsiveness Questionnaire or 
I7 (Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978), the Dickman Impulsivity Inventory (DII; Dickman,
1990), and the Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver 
& White, 1994). The investigators were interested in determining whether these scales 
measured broad or narrow components of impulsivity. The proposed factor structure of 
the BIS-11 was not supported in this study. Miller et al. note that the subscales o f BIS-11 
may not be orthogonal and may represent interrelated sub-factors of a super factor of 
impulsivity. Likewise, the proposed factor structure o f the BAS scale was not supported. 
Specifically, the subscales of the BAS all loaded highly onto one factor, suggesting that 
the BAS may be unidimensional (Miller et al., 2004). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that the BIS-11 and the BAS may be better understood as unidimensional 
measures o f impulsivity. Given the literature supporting multidimensional 
conceptualizations o f impulsivity (White et al., 1994), these assessments may not be ideal 
for measuring impulsivity.
Miller et al.’s (2004) findings suggest that the DII and I7 scales have similar two- 
component structures. Additionally, the strong correlations among subscales indicate that 
both scales measure the same aspects o f impulsiveness. These findings also support the
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notion that impulsiveness can be conceptualized as a multidimensional construct and thus 
should not be examined using unidimensional measures. Miller et al. propose that 
impulsivity may be ideally conceptualized as consisting o f three components. Given that 
Eysenck and Eysenck (1978) conceptualized impulsivity as an aspect of personality, it is 
likely that impulsivity uniquely affects one’s decision-making process, especially when 
making risky decisions, which require more deliberate decisional processes. Likewise, 
greater impulsivity may cause clinically significant impairments across a variety o f 
domains, including social, occupational, and educational, which also affects one’s 
decision-making abilities. For instance, individuals with Kleptomania repeatedly fail to 
control the impulse to steal objects even when such objects are not necessary for personal 
use or hold no monetary value (APA, 2013). Consequently, failure to control the impulse 
to steal overrides one’s decision-making abilities because there is no apparent reason for 
stealing. For the purposes of this study, non-clinical impulsivity that is characteristic of 
normal personality functioning will be examined.
Previous research suggests that impulsivity affects risky decision-making (Crone, 
Vendel, & van der Molen, 2003; Davis et al., 2007; Penolazzi, Gremigni, & Russo,
2012). For instance, Crone et al. (2003) examined the effects of disinhibition and age on 
performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the reverse IGT in a sample o f 
adolescents and adults. The IGT is an experimental gambling card task where participants 
are given fake money and must make a series of card selections from four decks o f cards. 
Like real gambling, the goal is to generate as much profit as possible. The decks o f cards 
are rigged, such that two of the decks result larger immediate gain, but are
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disadvantageous in the end as there are larger penalties. The other two decks produce a 
smaller immediate gain and lead to greater future advantages due to lower penalties. The 
participants are allowed to choose cards from any of the decks as they wish, but are not 
told how many card selections they will be required to make (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). In the reverse IGT, penalties are administered upfront and 
reward is gained later. Those decks with higher penalties also yielded higher rewards and 
those decks with lower penalties yielded lower rewards. Again, the high paying decks 
result in equivalent net gains as did the low paying decks (Crone et al., 2003).
Crone et al. (2003) slightly altered the original IGT insofar as money was 
substituted with apples, where the participants were gambling apples. The investigators 
found that as the IGT progressed, the low-disinhibited participants made more 
advantageous choices, evidencing learning, whereas the disinhibited individuals did not. 
On the reverse task, however, the disinhibited individuals appeared to make more 
advantageous choices as the task progressed. Crone et al. report that these findings are 
consistent with previous literature and may suggest that such individuals make poor 
decisions in their real lives. This suggests that disinhibited individuals may use faulty 
response sets that are less attuned to processing future consequences which may require a 
shift in response set or approach. Their finding that disinhibited people performed better 
on the reverse IGT is surprising and suggests that perhaps disinhibited people are 
sensitive to rewards opposed to future consequences.
There were also age-related differences on task performance. The youngest 
participants ( 1 2 - 1 3  year olds) had the fastest response times compared to the older
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adolescents (15 -  16 years) and young adults (college students). In fact, the young adults 
had the slowest response times of all groups. Additionally, participants who were 
disinhibited had faster reaction times compared to the inhibited group. These findings are 
consistent with age-related trends that Crone and van der Molen (2007) found in another 
sample. Specifically, these findings suggest that younger individuals are less sensitive to 
future outcomes than older samples (Crone et al., 2003; Crone & van der Molen, 2007). 
Accordingly, these findings suggest there may be age-related changes in disinhibition, or 
impulsivity, where older participants evidence less disinhibition than younger 
participants. A limitation of this study, however, was that they did not examine age- 
related changes in impulsivity in adult samples. Specifically, they failed to address 
whether or not people become more inhibited as they age, or if  this trend plateaus at some 
point during adulthood.
Davis et al. (2007) also found that participants who were more impulsive 
performed more poorly on the IGT. Specifically, they found that those participants who 
failed to learn the task well enough to generate a positive amount o f money over the five 
blocks, were significantly more impulsive than the learners. They conclude that highly 
impulsive people may perform more poorly on decisions that require the decision maker 
to learn from previous mistakes and adjust behavior accordingly. With respect to risky 
decisions, highly impulsive participants were likely to make fast, poorly judged, and 
inconsistent decisions (Davis et al., 2007). Overall, these findings are consistent with 
those of Crone et al. (2003) insofar as individuals who are disinhibited or more impulsive 
tend to make poorly judged decisions that may be less sensitive to future consequences.
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Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest that as highly impulsive individuals age they 
may become less disinhibited; however, Davis et al. findings suggest that impulsivity 
continues to negatively affect the decision-making abilities of adults in their 30s and 40s. 
An important limitation of these studies is that longitudinal data regarding individual 
changes in impulsivity has not been collected. Thus, it is difficult to make conclusions 
about how individual differences in impulsivity affect decision-making across the life 
span. Future research should seek to explore this limitation.
Penolazzi et al. (2012) suggest that the decisional context, as well as the available 
information regarding the decision, directly influences the type of decision-making 
resources that are activated. These investigators assessed various factors related to 
decision-making, including impulsivity, and how these factors affected performance on 
the Columbia Card Task (CCT). The CCT is similar to the IGT insofar as the participants 
are instructed to try to maximize their game score through deciding upfront the number of 
cards they would like to draw from a deck of 32, which possesses both gain and loss 
cards. Three aspects of the game influence their decision: the amount of loss cards in the 
deck, the amount of points gained by choosing a gain card, and the amount o f points lost 
by choosing a loss card. There are two versions of the game, the Hot task and Cold task 
versions. During the Hot task, the participant makes stepwise card selections by revealing 
one card at a time and receiving immediate feedback. The participants are allowed to 
decide when they would like to discontinue playing, thus taking the round payoff, or they 
continue to play until they reveal a loss card, at which point the game ends. The Cold task 
of the CCT requires the participant to indicate upfront the number o f cards that they
36
would like to turn over during a given condition. Only at the end of each session will the 
participant receive feedback regarding their decision.
Penolazzi et al. (2012) found that participants who had higher trait impulsivity as 
measured by the I7 were more likely to select more cards during the Cold task of the CCT 
than participants with low trait impulsivity. They argue that the Cold task of the CCT has 
been shown to stimulate deliberative decision-making strategies, opposed to affective 
decision-making strategies. In this study, highly impulsive participants appeared to utilize 
affective decision-making strategies on a task that required more careful consideration. 
Furthermore, Penolazzi et al. suggest that these findings may indicate that impulsive 
people may struggle with real world cognitive based decisions requiring careful 
consideration o f various options and outcomes. Although this study examined how 
personality characteristics such as impulsivity influence risky decision-making processes 
as measured by an experimental gambling task, the investigators did not examine how 
impulsivity affects risky decisions across a variety o f decisional domains.
Taken together, these findings suggest that impulsivity, or disinhibition, 
negatively affects decision-making processes and can lead to inferior decisions. 
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that there are age-related differences in 
impulsiveness, which adds another element to this analysis. Much o f the research that has 
examined the relationships among impulsivity and decision-making have utilized 
gambling type tasks, which arguably represent real life risky decisions. One important 
limitation o f such research is that decisional domain has been largely unexplored. Some 
investigators suggest that risky decisions may be related to the domain in which the
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decision must be made, where some domains may yield higher risk tolerance than others 
(Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002). Given that previous research has shown that 
risk propensity is a function of decisional domain (Weber et al., 2002), future research 
should examine how impulsivity affects risky decisions made across a variety of 
decisional domains.
Issue Involvement and Decision-Making
Previous research has found that issue involvement is an influential factor in 
decision- making (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Maheswaran & 
Meyers-Levy, 1990; Pham, 1998). Issue involvement refers to the degree to which one is 
invested or involved in a particular issue or decision. Petty and Cacioppo (1979) 
suggested that the degree to which one is invested in an issue will increase or decrease 
the effects o f persuasion, as the individual will be more motivated to attend to and 
process relevant information, thus affecting decision-making. They also note that there 
are two types o f issue involvement. One type o f issue involvement pertains to whether 
the attitudinal issue is o f personal importance. This has also been referred to as ego- 
involvement, personal involvement, and personal relevance (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; 
Pham, 1998). Comparatively, the second type o f issue involvement, referred to as 
response involvement, pertains to whether the response is o f importance. This has also 
been referred to as task involvement (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).
Petty and Cacioppo’s (1979) research has focused on the first type o f issue 
involvement. They note that highly involved individuals report a sense o f intrinsic 
importance in the issue and perceive the issue as having a significant impact on their
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lives. They report that most o f the early work concerning issue involvement sought 
groups o f participants that naturally differed on the extent to which they were involved 
with a particular issue, while later work sought to manipulate the level o f involvement. 
Such manipulations translated into presenting participants with issues with which they 
were highly involved, such as the possibility of increasing tuition for college students, 
and issues with which they had low levels of involvement, such as expanding public park 
acreage in a nearby park. Additionally, manipulation studies used message framing 
designs that made participants believe that proposed changes would or would not directly 
affect them (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).
Petty and Cacioppo (1979) conducted a manipulation study to examine the 
cognitive response framework of the effects o f issue involvement. In this study, they had 
24 male college students listen to arguments about changes in university policies 
regarding mixed-sex visitation and these arguments were either of high or low 
importance. This study involved a 2x2 design, where importance and attitude were 
manipulated. High importance arguments were those where the policy changes were 
proposed to be instated at the students’ current school, while low importance arguments 
suggested that the policy changes would be instated at a school in the area. The 
Participants either heard a message that was for (proattitudinal) or against 
(counterattitudinal) such policy changes. Petty and Cacioppo predicted that high 
involvement would enhance message processing. In order to measure the participants’ 
attitudes, Petty and Cacioppo had participants read the following statement and rate their 
position on four scales: “Because your own opinion about the position advocated on the
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tape may influence the way you rate the quality of the tape, we would like to obtain a 
measure o f how you feel about the views proposed by the speaker on each scale below” 
(1979, p. 1918).
Petty and Cacioppo (1979) found that those participants in the high involvement 
condition indeed found the arguments more involving than those participants in the low 
involvement condition. They also found that issue involvement significantly reduced the 
effectiveness of the counterattitudinal message and heightened the effectiveness of the 
proattitudinal message. Furthermore, they found that high issue involvement amplified 
persuasion for strong messages and reduced the persuasion of weak messages. These 
findings suggest that issue involvement affects the perceived importance of a message, 
thus influencing the persuasion o f an argument (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).
Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) reported similar findings and suggested 
that when issue involvement was low, participants based their attitudes and responses on 
simple inferences. When issue involvement was high, however, participants appeared to 
process the message in detail and integrate it with issue-relevant information, yielding 
greater persuasiveness. They also found an interaction between issue involvement and 
message framing, where under low involvement conditions, participants were more likely 
to be persuaded by positive frames compared to negative frames. Under high 
involvement conditions, however, they found that participants assigned disproportionate 
weight to negatively framed messages, thus making them more persuasive than positively 
framed messages. Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy argue that these findings suggest that
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decision-making processes are complex and appear to be dependent upon the integration 
o f relevant information, such as message frame and issue involvement.
One limitation of these studies is that they have only examined issues 
involvement within the context o f message framing studies. Consequently, research has 
not investigated how issue involvement, decisional domain, and other personal factors, 
such as age, influence risky decisions made in various domains. It may be that people are 
more or less prone to making risky decisions when those decisional domains are of 
significant importance.
Cognition, Numeric Ability, and Decision-Making
Research suggests that there are age-related changes in cognitive abilities, such as 
executive functioning (EF), intelligence (crystalized and fluid), working memory, and 
numeric ability (Del Missier, Mantyla, & Bruine de Bruin, 2012). Moreover, such 
changes may affect the ways in which people make decisions and overall decision­
making competence. For instance, Finucane and Gullion (2010) found that crystalized 
intelligence scores remained relatively high across groups of older adults aged 25 to 97 
years. Comparatively, fluid intelligence scores were negatively related to age, with the 
oldest group o f participants (ages 75 to 97 years) having the lowest scores. Lower fluid 
intelligence has been associated with greater susceptibility to framing effects (Finucane et 
al., 2005) and poor application of decisional rules (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).
Finucane et al. (2005) also report that cognitive skills, including fluid and crystalized 
intelligence, accounted for approximately 46% of the variance associated with 
performance on comprehension problems in this sample o f adults. Accordingly, cognitive
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abilities play an important role in decision-making processes and persons o f various ages 
may make risky decisions differentially based on their cognitive abilities.
Li et al. (2013) hypothesized that the type o f intelligence required to make various 
types o f decisions may lead to different decisional outcomes among older and younger 
adults. Specifically, they suggest that older adults may perform better on decisions that 
require strong crystallized intelligence compared to younger adults. Likewise, they 
hypothesize that decisional performance that is based on fluid intelligence may suffer in 
older compared to younger samples due to age-related decreases in fluid intelligence. 
They also proposed a complimentary effects hypothesis, which stated that older adults’ 
intact crystalized intelligence will provide an alternative pathway leading to good 
decisions and may at least partially buffer the negative effects o f lowered fluid 
intelligence. They found that in a sample o f younger (age range: 1 8 - 2 9  years, M -  
24.76, SD = 2.91) and older adults (age range: 60 -  82 years, M =  66.39, SD = 4.93), the 
younger adults outperformed their counterparts on measures o f fluid intelligence, while 
the older adults outperformed the younger participants on measures o f crystallized 
intelligence (Li et al., 2013).
Li et al. (2013) also assessed the influence o f intelligence, temporal discounting, 
loss aversion, financial literacy, and anchoring, which are traits that affect decision­
making processes, on various economic decisions. Temporal discounting refers to the 
extent to which one discounts future gains or losses and research suggests that it has a 
significant influence on financial decisions, such as whether to borrow money with a 
credit card. Loss aversion refers to the extent to which the value o f potential loss
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outweighs the value o f potential gains and has been shown to affect financial decisions 
regarding stocks and investments, to name a few. Financial literacy refers to the extent to 
which one comprehends financial information and decisions as well as the ability to make 
competent decisions related to debt contracts and interest rates. Financial literacy has a 
significant influence on consumer’s borrowing and saving behavior. Finally, vulnerability 
to anchoring refers to the degree to which one number may influence later number 
judgments. Susceptibility to anchoring has been shown to influence consumer judgments 
o f buying and selling prices, perceptions o f product values, and credit card repayment 
decisions.
Li et al. (2013) found that older and younger adults did not significantly differ on 
measures o f economic decision-making. Furthermore, they report that type o f intelligence 
partially explained age-related differences on the four types o f decision-making traits. 
Specifically, they report that the older adults’ higher levels o f crystalized intelligence 
offset their lower levels o f fluid intelligence on decisions that were affected by temporal 
discounting, financial literacy, and debt literacy. Despite this finding, age had a direct 
effect on economic decisions affected by financial literacy and the effects o f  age were 
intensified after controlling for type o f intelligence on debt literacy decisions. Li et al. 
suggest that these two areas may be affected by domain-specific knowledge, which was 
not measured in this study. Accordingly, future research should seek to obtain a baseline 
measure o f domain-specific knowledge when assessing the effects o f cognitive abilities 
on decision-making processes.
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Del Missier et al. (2012) examined the effects of specific types o f cognitive 
abilities, namely fluid intelligence and numeric ability, and executive functioning on 
decision-making competence o f adults. Specifically, they were interested in determining 
whether type o f cognitive ability mediated the relationship between executive functioning 
and cognitively demanding decision-making tasks as measured by the Iowa Gambling 
Task. Del Missier et al. found that type of cognitive ability and executive functioning are 
related to performance on demanding decision-making tasks. Specifically, they found that 
fluid intelligence was positively correlated with decision-making performance, with the 
strongest correlations with the most demanding decisional tasks. Accordingly, fluid 
intelligence is one type o f cognitive ability that appears to influence individual 
performance on decision-making tasks. An important limitation of this study is that only 
one type o f decisional task was utilized. Thus, it is difficult to extend these findings to 
other, non-financial risky decisions that people make on a regular basis. Consequently, 
Del Missier et al. suggest that future research should seek to examine the influences of 
cognitive ability and executive functioning, as well as task specificity on decision-making 
processes.
Based on these previous findings, it appears that different types o f cognitive 
abilities, such as type o f intelligence, may differentially affect performance on risky 
decision-making tasks. Furthermore, it appears that age-related changes in cognitive 
abilities may add another layer o f complexity to this relationship. Specifically, it has been 
suggested that as people age, they may rely more heavily on task nonspecific resources, 
such as crystalized intelligence when working a problem that taps into fluid intelligence.
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It has been suggested that this reliance, or compliment, may buffer the effects o f age- 
related changes in cognitive abilities on task performance. Another type o f cognitive 
ability, numeracy, is also important when making decisions, especially those that are 
based on numeric information.
One of the most critical aspects o f understanding risk communication relates to 
the respondent’s ability to understand numerical expressions of risk, such a probabilities, 
percentages, proportions, and frequencies. Peters (2008) suggests that when respondents 
do not understand the data pertaining to the risk, it leads to confusion and difficulty in 
understanding the consequences of the risk not only for themselves, but for others as 
well. Such confusion reduces the respondent’s ability to make an effective decision. 
Finucane and Gullion (2010) found that numeric ability accounted for 3.9% of the 
variance associated with performance on comprehension problems for a sample of adults. 
Research also suggests that innumeracy may actually interfere with an individual’s ability 
to make risky decisions, especially those related to personal health risks (Lipkus et al., 
2001; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997).
Schwartz et al. (1997) examined the relationship between numeric ability and 
women’s ability to discern the benefit o f mammography after receiving quantitative 
information regarding health benefits of this screening. The sample included women aged 
27 to 8 8  years and 96% of this sample had completed high school. Numeric ability was 
assessed with three questions that examined familiarity with probabilities, percentages, 
and proportions. Each participant also received one o f four types o f risk reduction data 
that only differed in how the messages were framed. These messages were either framed
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in a percentage o f risk reduction, percentage along with baseline data regarding the risk 
o f dying from breast cancer within the next 1 0  years, probability o f risk reduction, or the 
probability o f risk reduction along with baseline information regarding the risk o f breast 
cancer death in the next 10 years. The investigators also examined the women’s 
perceived risk for death from breast cancer using two scenarios, one o f which asked them 
to report on the number o f women per 1 0 0 0  whom they believed would not get screened 
yearly and the other asked them to report the number o f women per 1 0 0 0  they believed 
would get screened yearly. Risk accuracy was assessed by comparing the women’s 
responses about death rates per 1 0 0 0  for not getting screened and their responses about 
death rates per 1000 with screening. The accuracy was determined based on how well the 
women were able to apply the risk reduction data to their perceived risk o f death, thus the 
change in perceived risk with and without screening was of importance (Schwartz et al., 
1997).
Schwartz et al. (1997) found that almost half o f the sample did not answer a 
simple probability question regarding a coin flip correctly. The women in this study also 
evidenced difficulty with converting percentages to probabilities, with difficulty of 
conversion leading to more errors. Surprisingly, 30% of this sample did not answer any 
of the three numeric questions correctly. Furthermore, the investigators found that after 
reading about risk reduction data, most women erroneously applied this information to 
estimates o f perceived risk of death of breast cancer both with and without 
mammography. It appeared that all four types o f risk reduction data were similarly poorly 
applied to estimates o f risk. The investigators found that higher numeric ability was
associated with more accurate applications of relative risk information (Schwartz et al., 
1997). Taken together, these findings suggest that there is a strong association between 
numeric ability and risky decision-making. Perhaps most alarming is that almost all of 
this sample had a high school education, yet was unable to solve simple numeric 
problems. It is clear that innumeracy negatively affected the women’s ability to make 
accurate decisions regarding relative risk. These findings raise important implications for 
advertisers and medical professionals who regularly use quantitative data in their 
communication o f risk.
Lipkus et al. (2001) examined global numeric ability in a sample of 463 well- 
educated adults aged 40 years and older who had post-secondary education. They used 
two scales to assess numeric ability: a general scale, which consisted of three questions 
that tapped into probability, percentage, and proportion ability, and an extended 
numeracy scale that assessed these same areas, but within a health risk context. They 
found that approximately 40% of their sample was not able to correctly respond to the 
general numeracy items, such as converting a percentage to a proportion. Likewise, they 
found that converting probabilities to proportions was the most difficult task, as indicated 
by poorest performance in this sample. Overall, they found that approximately 15% to 
21 % of the sample was able to correctly respond to all general numeracy items, whereas 
29% to 34% correctly responded to all o f the expanded numeracy items. Taken together 
these results suggest that even well-educated adults have difficulty accurately using and 
interpreting risk communications that involve basic mathematics. Furthermore, the 
authors suggest that accurate performance to numeracy items posed within the context o f
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health risks does not mean that the respondent will understand the consequences o f the 
risk or apply this information to themselves. Thus, these findings suggest that numeric 
ability may influence risky decision-making; however, other factors may intervene and 
prevent the respondent from personalizing the presented risk.
Schwartz et al. (1997) note that the majority o f research pertaining to numeric 
ability and risky decision-making has been situated within message framing paradigms, 
where identical information is presented in different ways in order to determine the 
influence of the message context, or frame on decision-making. Peters et al. (2006) report 
that less numerate individuals show greater susceptibility to framing effects. They also 
argue that those with greater numeric ability may be better able to access the required 
numeric principles that allow them to transform the information within the frame more 
accurately. Much less research has examined the role o f decisional domain on 
perceptions o f risk and risk behavior (Weber et al., 2002).
Decisional Domain, Risk Taking, and Decision-Making
Recently, a number o f investigators have begun to challenge the widely held 
belief that people can be classified as generally risk taking or risk aversive. This 
dichotomy suggests that one’s risk propensity is a stable trait (Blais & Weber, 2006; 
Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002). Weber et al. (2002) argue that people generally 
differ in their attitudes towards risk and previous measures o f risk taking attitudes have 
failed to adequately measure this concept. Specifically, they argue that previous measures 
situated within the expected utility (EU) framework lack cross-domain consistency and 
predictive validity. Accordingly, these investigators created the Domain-Specific Risk-
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Taking Scale (DOSPERT), which seeks to examine one’s perception o f risk, attitude 
towards perceived risks, and expected benefits from engaging in the risky behavior.
Hanoch et al. (2006) examined the external validity o f the DOSPERT using 
homogeneous samples o f risk taking individuals. In order to achieve this, they selected 
samples of people who are risk seekers in each domain, including but not limited to 
skydivers, smokers, and gamblers, as well as individuals who are risk averse in the health 
domain, using gym attendance as a proxy measure o f health consciousness. They 
hypothesized that within each domain, the target subsample would show greater risk 
tolerance compared to the other subsamples. Furthermore, they hypothesized that the 
subsamples would not show the same risk propensity across all domains, suggesting that 
risk tolerance is domain specific. Finally, they hypothesized that the subsample o f risk 
adverse individuals (gym attendees) would show less risk behavior in the health domain. 
Hanoch et al. found that there was a significant domain by subsample interaction, where 
the subsamples of risk-takers evidenced greater risk propensity in the target domain 
compared to the other subsamples. Likewise, the risk adverse subsample o f gym 
attendees had significantly lower risk tolerance compared to the risk-seeking smokers 
within the health domain. Accordingly, these results support the validity o f the 
DOSPERT in identifying individual differences in domain-specific risk tolerance.
Hanoch et al. also found that the subsamples reported significantly different levels of 
expected benefit for engaging in the risky behavior across the domains, suggesting that 
those who are risk seeking in a given domain perceive greater benefits compared to those 
who are less risk seeking or risk adverse. Interestingly, Hanoch et al. found that the
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subsample o f gamblers had significantly lower risk perceptions than the other 
subsamples. Taken together, Hanoch et al. reported that these findings suggest that the 
expected benefits o f engaging in domain-specific risky behavior may be more influential 
in determining risk propensity than perceived risk. Likewise, these results show that 
individual differences in expected benefits and risk propensity relate to differences in 
risky behavior across a variety o f domains (Hanoch et al., 2006).
Hanoch et al. (2006) report that there are mixed results in the literature pertaining 
to predictors o f risky behavior. Specifically, they found that domain-specific expected 
benefits of risky behavior were more predictive o f risk propensity than perceived risk; 
whereas Weber et al. (2002) and Blais and Weber (2006) found that perceived risk was 
more predictive. In fact, Blais and Weber found that controlling for risk perception 
reduced the within-individual, or domain-level, variance in risk taking by 59%. One 
reason for these inconsistent findings may be due to the study participants. Hanoch et al. 
selected participants who were risk seeking or risk adverse across domains in an effort to 
test the external validity of the DOSPERT. Comparatively, Weber et al. used a 
heterogeneous group o f college students. Based on these findings, future research should 
seek to examine the predictive nature o f the DOSPERT using both heterogeneous and 
homogeneous samples. Additionally, investigators should examine whether predictors o f 
risk differ for individuals who have high versus low risk tolerance across the decisional 
domains.
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Significance of the Present Study
As previously noted, traditional models o f risky decision-making do not 
accurately capture the complexity o f decision-making processes. Likewise, much of the 
contemporary literature has examined single factors that interfere with decision-making 
processes, but fail to provide a holistic model o f universal personal factors that influence 
risky decision-making. Research also suggests that people may vary in their tendency to 
make risky decisions depending on the domain in which the decision is required. To date, 
only a few studies have examined the effect o f decisional domain on the decision-making 
process. Likewise, little is known about the stability o f decision-making processes across 
the adult lifespan. Accordingly, this study tested comprehensive models o f risky financial 
and health-related decision-making that examined the influence o f personal factors 
including age, gender, cognitive abilities (including crystalized and fluid intelligence), 
numeric ability, trait impulsivity, and domain-specific risk perception, attitude, and 
expected benefits of risky decisions.
The Present Study 
The present study utilized hierarchical linear regression analysis to test the 
moderating effects o f the DOSPERT subscales (expected benefit o f engaging in risky 
behavior, perceived risk, and attitudes towards risk) and impulsivity on the relationships 
between cognitive abilities (intelligence and numeric ability), and health and financial 
risky decisions. Young adults enrolled in college psychology courses as well as older 
adults enrolled in fitness programs were included in this study.
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Hypothesis 1
It was predicted that males and females would differ in the number o f risky 
domain-specific decisions that they make.
Hypothesis la . Males will make more risky financial decisions than females.
Hypothesis lb . Males will make more risky health decisions than females. 
Justification for Hypotheses la  and lb
Previous research indicates that males make riskier decisions and engage in more 
risky behavior than females (Byrnes et al., 1999; Chamess & Gneezy, 2012; Harris et al., 
2006; Hillier & Morrongiello, 1998; Weber et al., 2002). This gender trend has also been 
replicated in domain-specific risk taking behavior (Harris et al., 2006; Weber et al.,
2002). It was predicted that gender differences in risky decision-making in financial and 
health domains will be replicated in this study. It was also proposed that significant 
gender differences in risky decision-making would be controlled in subsequent analyses. 
Hypothesis 2
It was predicted that older and younger adults would differ in the number o f risky 
domain-specific decisions that they made. Specifically, younger adults would make more 
domain-specific risky decisions than older adults.
Justification for Hypothesis 2
Previous research regarding decision-making competence among older and 
younger adults yields mixed findings (Li et al., 2013). Additionally, research suggests 
that a variety o f factors, such as the context o f information under consideration and 
intelligence may affect older and younger adults’ ability to make competent decision
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Li et al., 2013). Collectively, research suggests that there 
may be some age-related differences in decision-making abilities o f older and younger 
adults; however, additional research is required to assess age-related differences in 
domain-specific risky decision-making. It was proposed that if  older and younger adults 
differed in the amount o f domain-specific risky decisions that they made then age would 
be entered as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
Hypothesis 3
It was predicted that subscale scores o f the DOSPERT (Perception o f risk, 
Attitudes towards risk, and Expected benefits of risky behavior) would moderate the 
relationships between cognitive abilities (total cognitive abilities and numeric ability) and 














Figure 1. Hypothesized moderating effects o f the DOSPERT subscales on the 
relationship between cognitive abilities and financial risky decisions.
Hypothesis 3a. Hypothesis 3a stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly 
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated 
by risk perception, such that risk perception will increase the impact o f cognitive abilities 
on risky financial decision-making.
Hypothesis 3b. Hypothesis 3b stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly 
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated
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by risk taking, such that risk taking will decrease the impact o f cognitive abilities on risky 
financial decision-making.
Hypothesis 3c. Hypothesis 3c stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly 
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated 
by expected benefits, such that expected benefits will decrease the impact o f cognitive 
abilities on risky financial decision-making.
Justification for Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c
Previous research indicates that there is a direct relationship between cognitive 
abilities and risky financial decision-making and it is has been suggested that this 
relationship is affected by domain-specific knowledge (Li et al., 2013). Similarly, 
perception of risk, attitudes towards risk, and expected benefits o f engaging in risky 
behavior are significant predictors of risky financial decision-making (Blais & Weber, 
2006; Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002). In the present study, domain-specific risk 
perception, risk taking, and expected benefits of risky behavior were proposed to 
moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities and risky financial decision-making 
as these variables may influence the relative salience of risk communication, thus altering 
the existing relationship between cognitive abilities and risky financial decision-making.
It was hypothesized that risk perception would increase the impact o f cognitive 
abilities on risky financial decision-making as risk perception has been shown to 
differentially affect estimates o f relative gains and losses and lead to more or less risk 
taking behavior (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Similarly, risk taking was hypothesized to
moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities and risky financial decisions such 
that it would decrease the impact of cognitive abilities on risky financial decision­
making, as previous research has found that risk propensity significantly affects the 
salience o f relative threat or opportunity in risk communication (Sitkin & Weingart,
1995). Finally, expected benefits of risky financial decision-making was hypothesized to 
decrease the impact o f cognitive abilities on risky financial decision-making. Hanoch et 
al. (2006) found that subsamples o f risk seeking individuals significantly differed in their 
ratings o f expected benefits o f domain-specific risky behavior, increasing their likelihood 
of engaging in domain-specific risky behavior. Accordingly, they argued that expected 
benefits of risky behavior significantly affected the decision-making process whereby 
subsamples of risk seekers were more likely to engage in risky domain-specific behavior. 
Hypothesis 4
It was predicted that subscale scores of the DOSPERT (Perception o f risk, 
Attitudes towards risk, and Expected benefits o f risky behavior) would moderate the 














Figure 2. Hypothesized moderating effects of the DOSPERT subscales on the 
relationship between cognitive abilities and health risky decisions.
Hypothesis 4a. Hypothesis 4a stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly 
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated 
by risk perception, such that risk perception will increase the impact o f cognitive abilities 
on risky health decision-making.
Hypothesis 4b. Hypothesis 4b stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly 
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated
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by risk taking, such that risk taking will decrease the impact o f cognitive abilities on risky 
health decision-making.
Hypothesis 4c. Hypothesis 4c stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly 
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated 
by expected benefits, such that expected benefits will decrease the impact o f cognitive 
abilities on risky health decision-making.
Justification for Hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 4c
Published research demonstrates a relationship between cognitive abilities and 
risky health decision-making (Schwartz et al., 1997). Moreover, the risky decision­
making process is affected by domain-specific knowledge and risk propensity, including 
risk perception, risk taking, and expected benefits (Blais & Weber, 2006; Hanoch et al., 
2006; Weber et al., 2002). Measures o f risk propensity (risk perception, risk taking, and 
expected benefits) are hypothesized to moderate the relationship between cognitive 
abilities and risky health decisions as these factors may alter the salience o f risk 
communication. For instance, risk perception may influence approximations o f relative 
gains and losses presented in risk communication. Similarly, risk taking, or one’s general 
inclination toward risky behavior may differentially underscore the relative threat or 
opportunity in risk communication, thus affecting risky decision-making (Sitkin & 
Weingart, 1005). Expected benefits of risky behavior have been found to predict actual 
risky decision-making and again may influence the ways in which risk communication is 
processed when making risky decisions (Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002).
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Hypothesis 5
It was predicted that impulsivity would moderate the relationship between 
cognitive abilities and domain-specific risky decisions.
Hypothesis 5a. Hypothesis 5a stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly 
and negatively related to risky financial decision-making, but this relationship will be 
moderated by impulsivity, such that impulsivity will decrease the impact o f cognitive 










Figure 3. Hypothesized moderating effects o f impulsivity on the relationship between 
cognitive abilities and financial risky decisions.
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Hypothesis 5b. Hypothesis 5b stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly 
and negatively related to risky health decision-making, but this relationship will be 
moderated by impulsivity, such that impulsivity will decrease the impact o f cognitive 










Figure 4. Hypothesized moderating effects o f impulsivity on the relationship between 
cognitive abilities and health risky decisions.
Justification for Hypotheses 5a and 5b
Previous research indicates that impulsivity affects risky decision-making 
processes (Crone et al., 2003; Davis et al., 2007; Penolazzi et al., 2012). Additionally,
research suggests that trait impulsivity may influence the type of decision-making 
strategy used by decision-makers. Penolazzi et al. (2012) found that more highly 
impulsive individuals have been found to engage in more affective decision-making 
compared to deliberative decision-making. These quick, poorly judged and affectively 
driven decisions may override one’s ability to engage in thorough and deliberate 
cognitive processes such as those required in this study. Accordingly, it was predicted 
that higher levels of trait impulsivity would negatively affect one’s ability to engage in 
deliberative reasoning and thus reduce the strength o f the relationship between cognitive 
abilities and domain-specific risky decision-making. Moreover, it was predicted that 
those individuals with higher trait impulsivity would make more risky decisions than 




In order to measure domain specific risky decision-making, hypothetical risk 
taking scenarios were created and pilot tested. The risky decision-making literature was 
reviewed, and in particular, items and scenarios that investigators have used to measure 
risky decision-making were examined (Mahoney, Buboltz, Levin, Doverspike, & 
Svyantek, 2011). In line with similar research, twenty hypothetical risky scenarios were 
created, 1 0  o f which assessed risky financial decisions and 1 0  o f which assessed risky 
health-related decisions (See Appendix G). In order to remain consistent with DOSPERT 
Health/Safety items, the health items also included safety behavior, such as wearing 
sunscreen for example. Issue involvement was induced in each scenario in order to make 
the decisions more salient to the respondent, as previous research indicates that issue 
involvement affects the decision-making process (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Likewise, 
numeric information including percentages, base rates, and timelines were included in the 
scenarios as research indicates that numeric ability affects the decision-making process 
(Lipkus et al., 2001). Participants were instructed to read each hypothetical risky scenario 
and choose between two options, A or B, one o f which reflected higher risk and the other 
o f which reflected lower risk. High and low risk options were counterbalanced among 
scenarios such that option A did not always indicate high risk. Participants were informed 
that there were no right or wrong answers. High risk options were assigned a value o f one
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and low risk options were assigned a value of zero. Domain-specific riskiness was 
calculated by summing the corresponding domain-specific items to yield an overall 
measure o f domain-specific risky decision-making.
The 20 risky decision-making hypothetical scenarios were administered to 91 
undergraduate students at a mid-sized Southern university. Prior to recruitment, approval 
to conduct this research was granted by the Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
Announcements regarding the study were made by course instructors in undergraduate 
psychology classes. All potential volunteers were informed of the nature o f the study, 
including the expected benefits and possible risks o f participation. Volunteers were 
informed of their right to withdraw participation at any time without penalty.
Data were screened for inclusion criteria and 13 participants were removed from 
analysis as they did not meet the age (18+ years) criterion that was clearly stated in the 
informed consent. Additionally, data was screened for missing values and participants 
with 10% or more missing data were removed from the sample (N=  10). The final 
sample consisted of 6 8  participants, 43 females (63%) and 24 males (35%). One 
participant did not indicate their gender. Participants ranged in age from 1 8 -5 6  years (M  
= 25.43, SD  = 8.63). Twenty-seven participants identified as seniors (39.7%), followed 
by 23 Master’s level (33.8%), six juniors (8 .8 %), five sophomores (7.4%), and four 
freshmen (5.9%), respectively. The ethnic distribution was restricted, with the majority of 
participants identifying as Caucasian (70.6%), followed by African American (16.2%), 
Hispanic (5.9%), Asian/Pacific Islander (4.4%), and “Other” (1.5%). The participant who 
identified as “Other” indicated that they were o f mixed ethnicity. Two participants did 
not report their ethnic identity.
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Participant responses were analyzed for response variability, where variability 
indicated that participants responded to scenarios in different ways. All items yielded 
response variability. Table 1 displays these findings. Next, the 20 risky decision-making 
items were administered to an expert panel for review. The expert panel consisted of 
faculty and doctoral level students (N  = 5), including individuals not associated with the 
current study. Experts were provided with the following definitions o f risky and risky 
decision-making: “Risky refers to exposure to something that has the potential to cause 
danger, harm, or loss. Risky decision-making then refers to how an individual navigates a 
choice situation that has the potential to cause harm, danger, or loss, yet at the same time, 
provides an opportunity to obtain an outcome that is perceived as positive or favorable.” 
Expert reviewers were instructed to read each scenario and using a 5-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 7 (Not at all risky and/or not representative o f risk domain) to 
5(Highly risky and/or representative o f risk domain), to indicate the degree to which each 
item represented a health or financial risky decision. Mean riskiness o f each scenario was 
calculated and presented in Table 1.
Based on the results o f the pilot study and review by the expert panel, the final 
risky decision-making scenarios were reduced from 2 0  to 1 1  hypothetical scenarios (see 
Appendix A). The Health risky decisions were reduced to six scenarios, and the Finance 
risky decisions were reduced to five scenarios that were most highly rated by the expert 
panel. High risk items were worth one point and low risk items were worth zero points. 
Domain-specific scenarios were summed, with higher scores indicating greater domain- 
specific risky decision-making. The health domain risky decision scenarios yielded a
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Kuder-Richardson 20 coefficient o f - .188 and the financial domain risky decision 
scenarios yielded a Kuder-Richardson 20 coefficient o f - .220.
Table 1
Risky Decision-Making Scenarios Descriptive Statistics
Item Option 
(A and B)
Frequency Percent(%) Item Mean KR-2
Delet
1 A 50 73.5 3.4 . 6 6
B 18 26.5
2 A 2 0 29.4 2 . 8 .44
B 48 70.6
3 A 17 25.0 3.2 .43
B 51 75.0
4 A 19 27.9 2 . 6 .42
B 49 72.1
5 A 13 19.1 3.4 .45
B 55 80.9
6 A ' 8 1 1 . 8 2 . 6 .45
B 60 8 8 . 2
7 A 16 23.5 2 . 8 .38
B 52 76.5
8 A 7 10.3 3.0 .43
B 61 89.7
9 A 64 94.1 4.0 .55
B 4 5.9
1 0 A 8 1 1 . 8 4.8 .41
B 60 8 8 . 2
1 1 A 2 2 32.4 4.2 .19
B 46 67.6
1 2 A 49 72.1 4.4 . 2 2
B 19 27.9
13 A 30 44.1 4.2 . 2 0
B 38 55.9
14 A 28 41.2 3.0 .04
B 40 58.8
15 A 35 51.5 3.4 .13
B 33 48.5
16 A 1 1 16.2 2.4 .07
B 57 83.8
17 A 2 2 32.4 4.0 . 1 2
B 46 67.6
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18 A 48 70.6 4.0 .29
B 2 0 29.4
19 A 18 26.5 4.0 .03
B 50 73.5
2 0 A 1 0 14.7 3.4 .06
B 58 85.3
Note. Frequency = number o f participants who endorsed item choice A or B. Percent (%) 
= percentage o f participants who endorsed item choice A or B. Item Mean = mean 
riskiness o f scenario as rated by expert panel, ranging from /(N ot at all risky and/or not 
representative o f risk domain) to 5(Highly risky and/or representative o f risk domain). 
KR-20 if  Deleted = Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficient if  item were deleted from 
set. The first ten items are financial domain risky scenarios. Refer to Appendix A to 
review measure.
Sample and Participant Selection
Several inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied. All participants were 
required to be o f legal age to consent to research participation. Participants were also 
required to complete the survey packets during one o f the specified time slots available. 
Participants were required to be within the age limits under investigation, which were 18 
-  30 and 55 -  89 years o f age. No participants were excluded from the final sample due 
to age. Participants were required to complete the informed consent form and no 
participants were removed from the sample due to non-consent. Any participant who 
scored within the impaired range (IQ below 70) on the Shipley-2 would have been 
removed from the sample; however, no participants scored within this range. Finally, 
those participants who had 15% or more missing data on any given measure were 
excluded (N  = 9). A power analysis was conducted in order to calculate the sample size 
required to detect a medium-sized effect with a power level o f .95. Based on this analysis, 
107 participants were recommended in order to achieve a medium sized effect o ff  =
0.15 with a power level of p = 0.95. Similarly, Green (1991) argues that if  a researcher
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seeks to test the overall fit of a regression model, R , then the following formula should 
be used to determine the minimum sample size, 50 + 8 k, where k indicates the number of 
predictors in the model. He also suggests that if  investigators seek to test the individual 
predictors in the model then the following formula should be used, 104 + k, where k 
again refers to the number of predictors. Based on these formulas, the target minimum 
sample size was estimated at 106 -  111. The initial sample consisted of 143 adults and 
eleven participants were removed due to excessive missing data.
The final sample included 133 adults. The younger adult sample, aged 18-30 
years, consisted of 108 (81.2%) adults from a midsized southern United States university. 
Comparatively, the older adult sample, aged 55-89 years, consisted o f 25 (18.8%) 
participants from two older adult fitness programs located in the southern and 
Midwestern United States. The final sample consisted of 80 (60.2%) females, 52 (39.1%) 
males, and one transgender (0.8%) individual. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 83 
years (M =  29.01, SD = 20.35). The ethnic distribution was restricted, where 108 (81.2%) 
participants were Caucasian/White, 17 (12.8%) were African American/Black, four 
(3.0%) were Asian, three (2.3%) were Native American, and one participant (0.8%) 
identified as “Other”, and this participants self-reportedly identified as Hispanic. Twenty- 
four (18.0%) participants indicated that they had previously been diagnosed with 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder.
Younger Adult Sample
Younger adult participants (18-30years) were recruited from undergraduate 
psychology courses at a southern US university. Permission to sample participants from 
these courses was obtained prior to participant recruitment.
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Older Adult Sample
Older adult participants (55-89 years) were recruited from older adult fitness 
programs tailored to the specific needs and abilities o f community-dwelling older adults. 
One program was run through a southern US university’s Department o f Kinesiology and 
the other was run through a Midwestern parks and recreation organization. Permission to 
sample participants from these programs was obtained prior to participant recruitment.
Measures 
Demographic Survey
Participants answered several questions pertaining to demographic characteristics. 
These questions included participant age, race/ethnicity, gender, education level, annual 
household income, marital status, employment status, as well as other personal 
information. Additionally, participants answered three questions about their financial 
independence, political orientation, and level o f religiosity using 5-point Likert-type 
scales (See Appendix B).
Impulsiveness Questionnaire (I7)
The I7 (Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978) consists o f 54 questions and three subscales, 
Impulsiveness, Venturesome, and Empathy. Impulsiveness refers to the tendency to act 
without much thought and failing to realize the risk involved in such behavior. 
Venturesome refers to the tendency to act, despite knowledge of the inherent risk in such 
behavior. Empathy refers to “a vicarious emotional response to the perceived emotional 
experiences o f others” (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972, p.525). The I7 uses a true/false 
response format (Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978). Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, and Allsopp 
(1985) reported good internal consistency reliability for the Impulsiveness subscale for
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males and females, 0.84 and 0.83, respectively. They also found good internal 
consistency reliability for the Venturesomeness subscale in males and females, 0.85 and 
0.84, respectively. Finally, they found acceptable internal consistency reliability, 0.69, for 
the Empathy subscale for males and females (Eysenck et al., 1985). The I7 also has good 
test-retest reliabilities for men and women on the Venturesomeness (.078) and 
Impulsiveness (0.90) scales. The I7 also has moderate to strong correlations with similar 
measures of impulsiveness, such as the Dickman Impulsivity Inventory (0.37 -  0.34), the 
BIS/BAS Scales (0.26 -  0.58), and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (0.52 -  0.58). Thus, 
the I7 has adequate convergent validity (Miller et al., 2004; See Appendix C). For the 
purposes o f this study, only the Impulsiveness subscale was included in the statistical 
model.
Domain-Specific Risk Taking Scale (DOSPERT)
The DOSPERT (Weber et al., 2002) consists of 40 questions and two major 
scales, Risk Behavior and Risk Perception (Blais & Weber, 2006). Risky behavior and 
perceptions of risk are measured across five domains: Ethical, Health/Safety, Recreation, 
Finance, and Social. These domains were selected because they represent common areas 
o f risk taking.
For the purposes o f this study, only the financial and health/safety domain 
questions were administered to the participants. Each domains consists o f eight questions, 
thus participants answered 16 o f the 40 questions. Respondents were required to answer 
each question three times, once as it pertained to risk behavior and twice as it related to 
risk perception. For the Risk Behavior scale, participants are asked to indicate on a 5- 
point Likert scale, from 1 ( Very unlikely) to 5(Very likely), the likelihood that they would
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engage in the stated behavior. Comparatively, the Risk Perception scale asked 
participants to rate on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1 (Not at all risky) to 5{Extremely risky) 
how risky each behavior was perceived to be. Likewise, participants were asked to rate 
the expected benefits of each scenario on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (No benefits at all) 
to 5(Great benefits) (Weber et al., 2002).
Weber et al. (2002) found that the Risk Behavior and Risk Perception scales have 
good internal consistency reliability, 0.88 and 0.89, respectively. They found that the 
Financial and Social subscales of the Risk Behavior scale had low test-retest reliabilities, 
0.44 and 0.58, respectively, while the Health, Ethics, and Recreation subscales had 
respectable test-retest reliabilities, 0.75, 0.72, and 0.80, respectively. A similar trend was 
found when they examined the Risk Perception subscales, where Financial and Social 
(0.42 and 0.47, respectively) were less stable than the Health, Ethics, and Recreation 
subscales (0.66, 0.67, and 0.56, respectively) (Weber et al., 2002).
Weber et al. (2002) reported that the Risk Behavior subscales o f the DSOPERT 
had good convergent validity with similar measures. For instance, Budner’s (1962) Scale 
for intolerance o f ambiguity correlated with all o f the Risk Behavior subscales o f the 
DOSPERT, suggesting adequate convergent validity. Likewise, all Risk Behavior 
subscales correlated highly with measures o f sensation seeking, such as Zuckerman’s 
(1994) Sensation-seeking scale, suggesting good convergent validity (Weber et al., 2002; 
See Appendix D).
Shipley-2
The Shipley-2 (Shipley, Gruber, Martin, & Klein, 2009) is a brief measure o f 
fluid and crystalized intelligence that provides an estimate of general cognitive ability
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and functioning. The Shipley-2 is self-administered and takes approximately 20 to 25 
minutes to complete and can be administered individually or within group settings. It has 
been normed on a large population of children and adults from the ages o f seven to 89 
years. In order to complete this assessment, the examinee must have a fourth grade 
reading level. The Shipley-2 provides both composite fluid and crystallized intelligence 
scores as well as an overall score o f cognitive ability. Additionally, the Shipley-2 
includes an index of impairment to screen for cognitive impairments. Crystallized 
intelligence is measured by the Vocabulary scale, whereas fluid intelligence can be 
measured using either the Abstraction or Block Patterns scales. The Abstraction scale 
consists o f 25 numeric and alpha puzzles to be solved by the examinee. The Block 
Patterns scale is a nonverbal measure o f fluid reasoning where participants solve patterns 
based on block representations. Examinees are given a maximum of 10 minutes to 
complete the Verbal scale, 12 minutes to complete the Abstraction scale, and 10 minutes 
to complete the Block Patterns scale (Shipley et al., 2009).
The Shipley-2 scales and composite scores have good to excellent internal 
consistency reliabilities. All reliability scores are reported for adults aged 17 -  89 years. 
The Vocabulary scale has internal consistency reliabilities that range from 0.85 to 0.92. 
The Abstraction scale has internal consistency reliabilities ranging from 0.66 to 0.91. The 
Block Patterns scale has internal consistency reliabilities ranging from 0.74 to 0.94. The 
Vocabulary + Abstraction Composite (Composite A) score ranges from 0.88 to 0.97, 
whereas the Vocabulary + Block Patterns Composite (Composite B) score ranges from 
0.91 to 0.95. The authors also reported good test-retest reliabilities for the Vocabulary, 
Abstraction, and Block Patterns scales, 0.94, 0.87, and 0.90, respectively. Composite A
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and B scores also yielded excellent test-retest reliabilities, 0.94 and 0.93, respectively 
(Shipley et al., 2009). The Shipley-2 also has moderate to strong correlations with the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Ill (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997). Shipley et al. (2009) 
note that the correlation strength is partially related to the content o f the various scales 
under comparison. The Shipley-2 composite scores and the WAIS-III Full Scale IQ 
(FSIQ) have strong positive correlations, suggesting that the Shipley-2 measures similar 
components of intelligence as the Wechsler system.
In this study, participants completed the Verbal and Block Patterns scales. The 
Block Patterns scale was selected because it generally has greater internal consistency 
reliability than the Abstraction scale and takes less time to complete. The Composite B 
score was used as a measure o f general cognitive abilities.
Numeracy Scale
The Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001) consists o f two scales, the General 
Numeracy Scale and the Expanded Numeracy Scale. The General Numeracy scale 
consists of three items, each one separately assessing probability, percentage, and 
proportion numeric ability. These questions are open-ended. Alpha reliabilities for the 
general items ranged from .57 to .63. The Expanded Numeracy scale consists o f seven 
items that examine probability, percentage, and proportion numeric abilities within the 
context o f health risks. These questions utilize both multiple choice and open-ended 
response formats. Lipkus et al. (2001) reported that this scale is best interpreted as a 
unidimensional measure, which indicates that both scales assess global numeric ability. 
Alpha reliabilities for the Expanded scale ranged from .70 to .75 (Lipkus et al., 2001; See 
Appendix E).
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Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short Form C
The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short Form C is a measure of 
social desirable responding, or the perceived need o f the respondent to respond to test 
items in a culturally appropriate and acceptable manner in order to gain social approval. 
Thus, this scale measures a respondent’s tendency to “fake good” or “fake bad” on 
questionnaire responses (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale Short Form C was adapted from the original Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The short form consists o f 13 true or false 
statements, o f which eight are keyed true and five false. The original scale yielded high 
internal consistency, .8 8 , and test-retest reliability o f .89. Additionally, the original 
measure correlated moderately with the validity scales o f the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI), which also measure aspects o f socially desirable 
responding and suggests good convergent validity. The short form also yields moderate 
correlations (- .52 - .59) with the MMPI validity scales, suggesting good convergent 
validity (Robinette, 1991). The short form c yields good reliability, r = .76, and correlates 
highly with the original form, r = .93,/? < .001. Thus, the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale Short Form C is a reliable and valid measure of socially desirable 
responding (See Appendix F).
Risky-Decision Scenarios
Eleven financial and health-related risky decision scenarios were be created by 
the investigator to measure domain-specific risky decision-making. Participants were 
required to read each scenario and choose between two decision options, A or B, one of 
which reflected higher risk and the other which reflected lower risk. The response options
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were coded, where 0  = less risky and 1 = more risky, and domain-specific risk taking was 
represented by summing the health and finance scenarios. Higher scores indicated greater 
domain-specific risk taking. (See Appendix H).
Procedure
Prior to participant recruitment, approval from the Institutional Review Board was 
granted to conduct this research. Ethical standards for human research were followed and 
participation in this study was voluntary. Participants were informed of their right to 
discontinue participation at any point without penalty. No personally identifiable 
information was kept and privacy o f the participants was maintained. Informed consent 
forms and survey packets were collected separately in order to ensure anonymity. The 
survey packets were only accessible to the primary investigator, research assistants, and 
dissertation chair o f this study. Survey packets were stored in secure environments.
In order to recruit younger adults, undergraduate psychology professors were 
notified o f this study and asked if  the primary investigator could post a flyer about this 
study onto the course website. Flyers provided brief information about his study, 
including dates and times for participation. Some professors may have offer extra course 
credit to students for research participation.
In order to recruit the older adults, permission to announce this study during 
fitness classes will first be obtained from the Adult Fitness Program Directors. Fitness 
class instructors were notified o f this study and granted permission for the investigator or 
research assistants to make announcements in fitness classes. Interested volunteers were 
provided with information regarding this study, including times and dates for study 
participation.
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Volunteers presented at a specified location in order to complete a survey packet. 
Data were collected over several recruitment days that spanned ten months. Participants 
completed the survey packets in one sitting. Surveys were administered to groups of 
participants ranging from one to twenty volunteers. Survey packets were administered in 
rooms without computers or other electronic devices, in order to deter cheating on the 
cognitive and computational components o f the study. Upon arrival, participants were 
given a survey packet, including the informed consent form. Participants were instructed 
to read and sign the informed consent form prior to further participation. Participants 
were allowed to use those materials that were required to complete these measures, 
namely, a pencil and eraser. All participants completed the Shipley-2 first, as there were 
general instructions regarding the entire test as well as the subtests. Additionally, these 
were timed tests and having all participants complete the subtests at the same time 
ensured that participants did not use extended time, which would invalidate their scores. 
All instructions were read verbatim to participants (see Appendices I and J). Participants 
first heard general instructions about this study and then were introduced to the Shipley-2 
cognitive tests. Next, the participants were read the instructions for the Verbal test. 
Participants had 10 minutes to complete the verbal test, at which point they were 
instructed to stop working. Next, the participants were read the instructions for the Block 
Patterns test. The participants had 10 minutes to complete the Block Patterns test, at 
which point they were instructed to stop working. Participants were reminded that they 
had unlimited time to complete the remaining measures in the survey packet. The 
remaining measures were counterbalanced in the survey packet. Participants required 
approximately 3 0 - 6 0  minutes to complete the survey packets.
CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS
Data were analyzed using Chronbach’s coefficient alpha, the Kuder-Richardson 
reliability coefficient, Independent -samples t tests, the Mann-Whitney U test, one-way 
analysis o f variance (ANOVA), and multiple regression analysis. Data were first 
screened for missing values and outliers, which were replaced using the person-mean 
substitution method, as it is an effective way of replacing missing data (Downey & King,
1998). Influential cases and outliers were assessed, which will be discussed below as 
they pertain to each analysis. Four outliers were detected and removed from the analyses 
conducted in hypotheses 1 and 2. Specifically, two multivariate outliers were detected 
using Mahalanobis distance and removed. Additionally, two univariate outliers were 
detected and removed (Field, 2009; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010).
Cronbach’s alpha was used to examine scale reliability. The DOSPERT (Weber et 
al., 2002) overall scale reliability was .69. The separate dimensions achieved a mean 
reliability o f .76, ranging from .73 to .78. The Risk Taking subscale yielded an acceptable 
reliability o f .73 (Cortina, 1993). The Risk Perception subscale also yielded an acceptable 
reliability o f .76. Finally, the Expected Benefits subscale yielded the highest reliability of 
.78, which is also considered acceptable (Cortina, 1993). Finally, the internal reliability 
of the Impulsiveness subscale o f the I7 (Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978) was also calculated 
using Cronbach’s alpha, which yielded an acceptable reliability o f .78 (Cortina, 1993). 
The Kuder-Richardson 20 (Kuder & Richardson, 1937) was used to examine the domain
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specific risky decision scenarios reliabilities, as these scenarios use forced choice 
dichotomous responses. The health scenarios yielded a reliability o f .195 and the finance 
scenarios yielded a reliability o f .103. Additionally, variable descriptive statistics are 
included in Table 2.
Table 2
Variable Descriptive Statistics
Variable M SD Reliability Skew Kurt
Risk Taking 35.14 8.69 .73 2.82 - . 0 1 2
Risk Perception 60.15 8.17 .76 -1.99 .231
Expected Benefits 31.85 7.43 .78 1.37 -.922
Impulsiveness 7.64 4.45 .78 3.81 3.79
Numeracy 7.91 2.52 — -3.73 -.454
Intelligence 105.89 12.16 — -2 . 0 2 -.043
Health 1.74 1.16 .19 1.54 .316
Finance 1 . 0 0 .891 . 1 0 2.71 -1.08
Note. M  = mean. SD = standard deviation. Skew = skewness. Kurt = kurtosis.
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to assess group differences on the 
independent and moderating variables as stated in hypotheses 1 and 2. Parametric 
assumptions were assessed prior to analysis. The assumptions o f interval level data and 
independence were satisfied. Normality was assessed using several methods, including 
the Kolmogorov-Smimov test, skewness and kurtosis scores, as well as visual inspection 
o f histograms with normality plots and p-p plots (Field, 2009; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010).
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Aside from the DOSPERT Risk Taking and Risk Perception variables, all other variables 
failed the assumption of normality. Accordingly, a square root transformation was 
applied to correct for non-normally distributed data (Field, 2009). Several variables, 
including: Numeracy, Block Design, Finance Domain Risky Decisions, and Health 
Domain Risky Decisions, were not sufficiently corrected to satisfy the assumption of 
normality. Additionally, homogeneity of variance was assessed using the Levene’s 
statistic and one analysis did not satisfy this assumption (older and younger adult risk 
taking behavior comparison). Accordingly, non-parametric tests such as the Mann- 
Whitney U test were used to assess group differences, as such tests are assumption free 
(Field, 2009). Bivariate correlations among the study variables are presented in Tables 3 
and 4.
Table 3
Bivariate Correlations fo r  Health Decisions
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Gen .16 -.24** -.28** -.19* -.07* -.41** .35** -.24**
2 Age — -.26* .2 1 * .07 -.36** _ 4 7 ** .36** -.36**
3 Heal — . 1 0 .08 .32** 4 9 ** -.28** .35**
4 Num — 4 9 ** -.16 .05 -.06 .08
5 IQ — -.19* * © o -.2 0 ** . 1 1
6  Imp — 2 7 * *
C
O
Or . 1 2
7 RT — -.54** .69**
8  RP — -.40**
9 EB —
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Note. Correlations between continuous variables indicate Pearson product moment 
correlations. Those between a continuous and dichotomous variable indicate a point- 
biserial correlation. Gen = participant gender. Age = participant age. Heal = health 
domain total score. Num = numeracy. IQ = total estimated intelligence. Imp = trait 
impulsivity. RT = DOSPERT risk taking behavior subscale score. RP = DOSPERT 
risk perception subscale score. EB = DOSPERT expected benefits subscale score. 
A =  129; */? < .05; **p < .01.
Table 4
Bivariate Correlations fo r  Financial Decisions
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Gender .16 -.04 -.28** -.19* -.07 _ 41 ** .35** -.25**
2 Age — .03 .2 1 * .07 -.36** _ 4 7 ** .36** -.37**
3 Finance — .15 .06 .16 2 3 ** -.07 .19*
4 Num — 4 9 ** -.16 .05 -.06 .08
5 IQ — -.19* - . 0 0 _ 2 3 ** . 1 1
6  Impuls — .27** -.03 . 1 2
7 RT Beh — . 5 4 ** .6 8 **
8  RP — _ 41**
9 EB —
Note. Correlations between continuous variables indicate Pearson product moment 
correlations. Correlations between a continuous and dichotomous variable indicate a 
point-biserial correlation. Gender = participant gender. Age = participant age. Finance= 
financial domain total score. Num = numeracy. IQ = total estimated intelligence. Impuls 
= trait impulsivity. RT Beh = DOSPERT risk taking behavior subscale score. RP = 
DOSPERT risk perception subscale score. EB = DOSPERT expected benefits subscale 
score.
N  = 129; *p < .05; **p < .01.
Across both types o f risky decision domains (health and finance), males scored 
higher on measures of numeracy, intelligence, risk taking (attitudes toward risk), and 
expected benefits o f risk. Comparatively, across the health and finance domains, females
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scored more highly on measures o f risk perception. Similarly, across health and financial 
domains, older adults scored higher on measures of numeracy and risk perception than 
younger adults, while younger adults had higher levels o f trait impulsivity, risk taking, 
and expected benefits o f risky behavior (see Tables 3 and 4).
For risky health decisions, there were a number o f correlations among study 
variables. Males had higher levels of trait impulsivity and made more risky health 
decisions (r = -.235) than females. Younger adults made more risky health decisions 
(r = -.255) than older adults. There were significant and positive relationships among 
impulsivity and risk taking, indicating that people who were more impulsive were more 
likely to engage in risky behavior. There was a significant, positive relationship between 
numeracy and intelligence, indicating that those participants with greater numeracy skills 
also had higher intelligence. Intelligence and impulsivity were significantly, negatively 
related, indicating that participants o f higher levels of intelligence had lower levels of 
trait impulsivity. Impulsivity and risk taking were positively related, which indicates that 
participants with greater trait impulsivity were more likely to take risks. Risk taking and 
expected benefits (r = .687) o f risky behavior were also significantly, positively related, 
indicating that those who perceived more possible benefits o f engaging in risky behavior 
were more likely to endorse risk taking. Risk perception was negatively related to risk 
taking (r = -.539) and expected benefits (r = -.406) o f risky behavior, indicating that 
participants who perceived more risk were less likely to make risks or expect benefits of 
risky behavior (see Table 3).
There were also several correlations among study variables related to risky 
financial decisions. There were significant, positive relationships among financial risky
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decisions, risk taking (r = .231), and expected benefits (r -  .193), indicating that those 
participants who expected greater benefits o f risky financial behavior and endorsed 
greater risk taking behavior made more risky financial decisions. There was also a 
significant, positive relationship between numeracy and intelligence, where participants 
who had greater numeracy skills were also o f higher intelligence. Intelligence was 
negatively related to impulsivity and risk perception, where participants of higher 
intelligence were less impulsive and perceived less risk in various risky scenarios. Risk 
taking and impulsivity (r = .230) were significantly and positively related, which 
indicates that participants who endorsed more trait impulsivity also endorsed more risk 
taking. Risk perception and risk taking (r = -.406) were significantly and negatively 
related, which indicates that participants who perceived greater risk endorsed less risk 
taking behavior. Expected benefits of risk taking (r -  .678) were significantly, positively 
related; those who perceived greater possible benefits o f risky behavior endorsed greater 
risk taking behavior. Finally, there was a significant, negative relationship between risk 
perception and expected benefits {r -  -.539); participants who perceived greater risk 
expected greater possible benefits o f risky behavior (see Table 4).
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated that males and females will differ in the number o f risky 
domain-specific decisions they make.
Hypothesis la
Males will make more risky financial decisions than females. The Mann-Whitney 
U Test was used to compare males and females on financial risky decisions. Males 
= 70.11) and females (MRank= 64.16) did not significantly differ on the number o f risky
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financial decisions that they made, U = 1892.50, z = -.925, p  = . 178, r -  -.020. Therefore, 
males did not make significantly more risky financial decisions compared to females. 
Thus, hypothesis la  is not supported.
Hypothesis lb
Males will make more risky health decisions than females. The Mann-Whitney U 
Test was used to compare males and females on risky health decisions. Males and 
females significantly differed on the number o f risky health decisions that they made, U =
1663.50, z  = -.1.999,p  = .023, r = - .173, where males (.MRank = 74.51) made significantly 
more risky health decisions compared to females (MRa„k = 61.29). Thus, hypothesis lb  is 
supported.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 stated that younger adults would make significantly more domain- 
specific risky decisions than older adults. The Mann-Whitney U Test was used to 
compare older and younger adults on domain-specific risky decisions. Older and 
younger adults significantly differed on the number o f risky health decisions they made, 
U=  929.00, z = -2.498, p  = .012, r = -.216, where younger adults (MRank = 70.90) made 
significantly more risky health decisions than older adults (M ^nk= 50.16).
Comparatively, older (MRank = 69.46) and younger (MRank = 66.43) adults did not 
significantly differ on the number o f risky financial decisions that they made, U =
1288.50, z  = -.375, p  = .718, r =  -.032. Thus, hypothesis 2 was partially supported. 
Parametric assumptions for regression analysis were tested and violations of
assumptions are discussed in each moderation analysis. Normality o f residuals were 
assessed using several methods, including visual inspection o f the P-P plots, histograms
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with normal curves, the Kolmogorov-Smimov test, skewness, and kurtosis. Several 
variables failed the assumption of residual normality as discussed below. Linearity and 
homoscedasticity were assessed via visual inspection o f the residual scatterplots, with 
rectangular plots indicating homoscedasticity. Several variables failed the assumption of 
homoscedasticity as discussed below. Tabachnick and Fidel (2013) note that failure of 
such assumptions does not necessarily invalidate regression analysis so much as it 
weakens the results because these violations have been shown to have little to no adverse 
effects on the analysis. Similarly, Bohmstedt and Carter (1971) note that regression 
analysis is robust; violations o f normality and homoscedasticity generally do not lead to 
significant statistical distortions because the distribution o f the errors tends to be 
normally distributed despite the shape o f the original distribution. Thus, regression 
analysis were conducted when variables failed these assumptions and are discussed in the 
limitations o f this study. Multicolinearity was assessed using various methods, including 
visual inspection o f correlation matrices, the variance inflation factor (VIF), and the 
tolerance statistic. The Durbin Watson statistic was used to assess for independent errors. 
Finally, all data were either categorical or quantitative, which satisfied the assumptions 
related to variable types (Field, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidel, 2013).
Hypotheses 3-5 were examined using a hierarchical regression analysis and the 
steps identified by Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004). First, all predictor and moderator 
variables were standardized. Next, interaction terms were created using the new 
standardized variables (impulsivity x numeracy, impulsivity x IQ, risk taking x 
numeracy, risk taking x IQ, risk perception x numeracy, risk perception x IQ, expected 
benefits x numeracy, and expected benefits x IQ). Eight separate moderation analyses
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were conducted to test the effects o f each moderator using a block entry design. A 
Bonferroni adjustment was used to control the family-wise Type I error rate when testing 
regression coefficients with a corrected criterion of significance o f p <  .00625 (Field, 
2009; Mundfrom, Perrett, Schaffer, Piccone, & Roozeboom, 2006). In the first step, age 
and gender were entered as control variables. In the second step, the independent 
variables (numeracy and IQ) and the moderator variables (impulsivity, risk taking, risk 
perception, expected benefits) were entered. In the third and final step, the associated 
interaction terms were entered (see above). The sections below present the results for 
each moderation analysis.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 stated that subscale scores o f the DOSPERT (Risk Perception, Risk 
Taking, and Expected Benefits) will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities 
(total estimated intelligence and numeracy) and risky financial decisions.
Hypothesis 3a
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, perception o f financial risk 
will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated 
intelligence) and risky financial decision-making. Three multivariate outliers were 
discovered. Regression analyses were conducted with and without these outliers to 
determine their effect on the overall statistical model. Removal o f these outliers had no 
significant impact on residual normality or the regression analysis, and thus they were not 
removed. The financial risk standardized residuals, D( 133) = .098, p  = .003, ZSkeWness = 
.636, Zkurtosis= - 1 -592, were significantly non-normal and thus failed the Kolmogorov- 
Smimov test of normality. According to Field (2009), large samples with small standard
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errors may produce significant deviations from normality. Thus, he argues that for 
samples o f this size, a z-score cutoff o f ±2.58 should be used to assess for significant 
deviations of normality. According to this standard, the residuals were approximately 
normally distributed. The data failed the assumption of homoscedasticity. Several 
investigators argue that moderate heteroscedasticity does not invalidate regression results, 
rather it weakens the results (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010). 
Moreover, Borhntedt and Carter (1971) argued that regression analysis is robust to 
violations of homoscedasticity. The assumptions o f no multicollinearity and independent 
errors were satisfied. Results of the moderation analysis are presented in Table 5.
Table 5
Risk Perception as a Moderator o f  the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and 
Financial Domain Risky Decisions
Variable R1 AR1 Ba SE B PD t 95% Cl
Step 1 .008 .008
Age . 0 0 2 .004 .039 .444 -.006, . 0 1 0
Gender -.155 .160 -.086 -.972 -.472, .161
Step 2 .033 .026
Age . 0 0 2 .004 .039 .410 -.007, .010
Gender -.038 .174 - . 0 2 1 -.216 -.382, .307
Numeracy .136 .096 .148 1.408 -.055, .326
IQ -.068 .097 i o -.701 -.261,. 124
Risk
Perception
-.115 .093 - . 1 2 0 -1.236 -.300, .069
Step 3 .072 .039
Age . 0 0 1 .004 .030 .313 -.007, .010
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Gender -.024 .172 -.013 -.138 -.364, .317
Numeracy .155 .097 .169 1.603 -.036, .346
IQ -.079 .097 -.083 -.820 -.271, .112
Risk
Perception
-.132 .093 -.137 -1.419 -.315, .052
NumxRiskPer -.069 . 1 1 0 -.071 -.622 -.278,.150
IQxRiskPer .225 .109 .236* 2.071 .010, .440
Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total 
estimated intelligence, Risk Perception = DOSPERT Risk Perception, NumxRiskPer = 
interaction between numeracy and risk perception, IQxRiskPer = interaction between 
total estimated intelligence and risk perception. 
a Unstandardized regression weight. Standardized beta weight.
The results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) did not 
significantly account for variance in risky financial decisions, R2= .008, R2adj = - .007,
F(2,130) = .513,/? = .600, as presented in Table 5. In the second step, cognitive abilities 
(numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and risk perception did not significantly 
contributed to the variance explained in risky financial decisions, AR2= .026, p  = .342,
F{5, 127) = .880,/? = .496. In the third step, the interactions between cognitive abilities 
(numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and risk perception did not significantly 
contribute to the amount o f variance explained in risky financial decisions, AR2 = .039, 
Fchangei2, 125) = 2.596,/? = .079. Based on these results, hypothesis 3a was not supported. 
Hypothesis 3b
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, attitudes towards (risk taking) 
financial risk will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and 
total estimated intelligence) and risky financial decisions. Eight multivariate outliers were
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identified. Moderation analysis was run with and without them to determine their 
influence on the overall model statistics. Removal of these outliers did not have a 
significant impact on residual normality or the regression analysis, and thus were not 
removed. The financial risk standardized residuals, D( 125) = .126,/? < .001, ZSkeWness -
2.594, Zkurtosis= - 090, were significantly non-normal according to the Kolmogorov- 
Smimov test o f normality. Field’s (2009) z-score cutoff o f ± 2.58 was utilized to 
determine residual normality. Moreover, several investigators note that moderate 
violations o f residual normality do not invalidate regression analysis, as regression is 
robust to violations o f normality (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Thus, the residuals were approximately normally distributed. 
The assumptions o f no multicollinearity and independent errors were satisfied. Results o f 
the moderation analysis are presented in Table 6 .
Table 6
Risk Taking as a Moderator o f  the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and 
Financial Domain Risky Decisions
Variable R AR1 B* SE B Pb t 95% Cl
Step 1 .008 .008
Age . 0 0 2 .004 .039 .444 -.006, . 0 1 0
Gender -.155 .160 -.086 -.972 -.472,. 161
Step 2 .085 .078*
Age .006 .004 .140 1.400 -.003,-015
Gender .089 .175 .049 .511 -.256, .435
Numeracy . 1 1 1 .094 . 1 2 1 1.186 -.074, .297
IQ -.029 .093 -.030 -.314 -.213, .155
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Risk Taking .307 .103 .309* 2.970 .102, .511
Step 3 .105 .019
Age .007 .005 .152 1.493 -.0 0 2 , .016
Gender .115 .176 .064 .654 -.234, .464
Numeracy .149 .096 .162 1.543 -.042, .340
IQ -.043 .093 -.045 -.460 -.227,-142
Risk Taking .310 .106 .312* 2.916 .100,.520
NumxRiskTak .162 . 1 0 1 .162 1.611 -.037, .361
IQxRiskTak -.097 .097 -.098 - 1 . 0 0 0 -.290, .095
Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 -= female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total
estimated intelligence, Risk Taking = DOSPERT Risk Taking, NumxRiskTak = 
interaction between numeracy and risk taking, IQxRiskTak = interaction between total 
estimated intelligence and risk taking.
a Unstandardized regression weight. Standardized beta weight.
*/? < .05.
Results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) did not significantly
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account for any variance in risky financial decisions, R = .008, R adj = - .007, F(2,130) = 
.513,p =  .600, as presented in Table 6 . In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy 
and total estimated intelligence) and risk taking (attitude toward risk) did not significantly 
contribute to variance explained in risky financial decisions, AR2 -  .078, Fchange{3, 127) = 
3.590,/? =.016, as the criterion o f significance p  < .00625 was employed. In the third 
step, the interactions between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated 
intelligence) and risk taking did not significantly contribute to the variance explained in 
risky financial decisions, AR = .019, FCf,ange(2, 125) = 1.343,/? = .265. Based on these 
results, hypothesis 3b was not supported, as the moderators did not significantly account 
for variance in risky financial decisions.
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Hypothesis 3c
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, expected benefits o f risk 
financial decisions will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy 
and total estimated intelligence) and risky financial decisions. Seven multivariate outliers 
were identified. Moderation analysis was run with and without them to determine their 
influence on the overall model statistics. Removal o f these outliers had no significant 
impact on residual normality or the regression analysis; they were not removed from the 
analysis. The financial risk standardized residuals, D(133) = .095,/? = .005, Zskewness= 
2.233, Zkurtosis= - 1-340, were significantly non-normal according to the Kolmogorov- 
Smimov test of normality. Field’s (2009) z-score cutoff o f ± 2.58 was utilized to 
determine residual normality. Thus, the residuals were approximately normally 
distributed. The data also failed the assumption o f homoscedasticity. Several 
investigators argue that heteroscedasticity does not invalidate regression as regression 
analysis is robust to this type o f violation (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971; Mertler & Vannatta, 
2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The assumptions o f no multicollinearity and 
independent errors were satisfied. Results o f the moderation analysis are presented in 
Table 7.
Table 7
Expected Benefits as a Moderator o f  the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and 
Health Domain Risky Decisions
Variable R2 M 1 ¥  SE~B p5  / 95% Cl
Step 1 .008 .008
Age .002 .004 .039 .444 -.006, .010
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Gender -.155 .160 -.086 -.972 -.472, .161
Step 2 .071 .063*
Age .004 .004 .099 1.024 -.004, .013
Gender -.010 .168 -.006 -.062 -.343, .332
Numeracy .108 .095 .117 1.138 -.080, .295
IQ -.046 .094 -.048 -.495 -.232, .139
Expected
Benefits
.232 .090 .247* 2.582 .054, .411
Step 3 .083 .013
Age .005 .004 .110 1.127 -.004, .014
Gender .008 .169 .004 .045 -.326, .341
Numeracy .127 .096 .138 1.321 -.063, .317
IQ -.053 .094 -.055 -.565 -.240, .133
Expected
Benefits
.239 .090 .253* 2.641 .060, .417
NumxExpBen .130 .100 .121 1.293 -.069, .328
IQxExpBen -.019 .095 -.019 -.205 -.207, .169
Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total 
estimated intelligence, Expected Benefits = DOSPERT Expected Benefits, NumxExpBen 
= interaction between numeracy and expected benefits, IQxExpBen = interaction between 
total estimated intelligence and expected benefits. 
a Unstandardized regression w eight.b Standardized beta weight.
*p <  .05.
Results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) did not significantly 
account for variance in finance domain risky decisions, R2 = .008 ,7?2adj = - .007, F(2 ,130)  
= .513,/? = .600, as presented in Table 7. In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy 
and total estimated intelligence) and expected benefits o f risky behavior did not
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significantly account for variance in risky financial decisions, AR = .063, Fchange{3, 127) 
= 2.863, p  =.039, as the criterion of significance p  < .00625 was employed. In the third 
step, the interactions between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated 
intelligence) and expected benefits did not explain significant variance in risky financial 
decisions, AR = .013, FChange(2,125) = .8 6 8 ,/? = .422. Based on these results, hypothesis 
3c was not supported because the moderator variables did not significantly account for 
any variance in risky financial decisions.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 stated that subscale scores o f the DOSPERT (Risk Perception, Risk 
Taking, and Expected Benefits) will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities 
(total estimated intelligence and numeracy) and risky health decisions.
Hypothesis 4a
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, perception o f health risk will 
moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated 
intelligence) and risky health decisions. One univariate outlier was identified and 
remained in the analysis as it did not have a significant effect on the overall statistical 
model. The assumptions o f normally distributed residuals, no multicollinearity, and 
independent errors were satisfied. The assumption of homoscedasticity was not satisfied. 
Several investigators argue that heteroscedasticity does not invalidate regression, as it is 
robust against moderate violations o f homoscedasticity (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971; 
Mertler & Vannatta, 2010 Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Results of the moderation 
analysis are presented in Table 8 .
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Table 8
Risk Perception as a Moderator o f  the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and 
Health Domain Risky Decisions
Variable R1 AR1 5 a SE B (3b t 95% Cl
Step 1 .090 .090*
Age - . 0 1 2 .005 -.213* -2.509 -.022, -.003
Gender -.419 .198 -.180* -2.119 -.810, -.028
Step 2 .129 .038
Age - . 0 1 2 .005 -.2 0 0 * -2.216 -.0 2 2 , - . 0 0 1
Gender -.226 .213 -.097 -1.060 -.648,.196
Numeracy .148 .118 .125 1.254 -.086, .381
IQ -.023 .119 -.018 -.190 -.259, .213
Risk
Perception
-.216 .114 -.174 -1.894 -.442, .010
Step 3 .148 . 0 2 0
Age - . 0 1 1 .005 -.191* -2 . 1 1 1 -.0 2 1 , - . 0 0 1
Gender -.239 .213 - . 1 0 2 - 1 . 1 2 2 -.659,.182
Numeracy .140 .119 .118 1.175 -.096, .377
IQ - . 0 2 0 . 1 2 0 -.016 -.170 -.258, .217
Risk
Perception
-.208 .115 -.168 -1.812 -.435, .019
NumxRiskPer -.008 .136 -.006 -.057 -.278, .262
IQxRiskPer -.169 .134 -.137 -1.257 -.435, .097
Note. Gender was coded 0 -  male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total 
estimated intelligence, Risk Perception = DOSPERT Risk Perception, NumxRiskPer = 
interaction between numeracy and risk perception, IQxRiskPer = interaction between 
total estimated intelligence and risk perception.
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a Unstandardized regression w eight.b Standardized beta weight.
*p < .05.
Results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) accounted for 9.0% of
7 7the variance in health domain risky decisions, R = .090, R adj= 076, F(2, 130) = 6.464, p  
= .002, as presented in Table 8 . In the first step, both age ((3 = -.21,/? = .013) and gender 
( P  =  -. 18 ,  p  =  .036) had negative relationships with health domain risky decisions. This 
indicates that males made more risky health-related decisions than females (gender was 
coded 0  for males and 1 for females), and that older adults made fewer risky health 
related decisions than younger adults. In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy 
and total estimated intelligence) and risk perception did not explain significant variance 
in health domain risky decisions, AR2 = .038,/? = .142, F (5,127) = 3.746,/? = .003. In the 
third step, the interactions between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated 
intelligence) and risk perception did not significantly account for variance in health 
domain risky decisions, AR = .020, Fchange(2, 125) = 1.448,/? = .239. Based on these 
results, males and younger adults made more risky health decisions compared to females 
and older adults. Given that the moderator did not significantly account for variance in 
risky health decisions, hypothesis 4a was not supported.
Hypothesis 4b
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, attitudes towards health risk 
will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated 
intelligence) and risky health decisions. Seven multivariate outliers were identified. 
Regression analysis was run with and without these outliers to determine their effect on 
the overall model. These outliers significantly affected the regression model and were
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removed. The assumptions o f normally distributed residuals, no multicollinearity, and 
independent errors were satisfied. The assumption o f homoscedasticity was not satisfied. 
Several investigators argue that moderate violations o f homoscedasticity are permissible, 
regression analysis is robust to violations o f this assumption (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971; 
Mertler & Vannatta, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Results o f the moderation 
analysis are presented in Table 9.
Table 9
Risk Taking as a Moderator o f  the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and Health 
Domain Risky Decisions
Variable R1 AR1 Tf SE B Pb / 95% Cl
Step 1 .072 .072*
Age \ © o .005 -.167 -1.898 -.020, .000
Gender -.438 .206 -.187* -2.122 -.846, -.029
Step 2 .245 174**
Age .000 .006 .006 .064 -.011,.012
Gender -.022 .208 -.009 -.104 -.434, .391
Numeracy .119 .122 .096 .980 -.122, .360
IQ .012 .120 .009 .103 -.225, .250
Risk Taking .691 .136 .487** 5.070 .421,.960
Step 3 .247 .001
Age -1.387 .006 .000 -.002 -.012, .012
Gender -.012 .213 -.005 -.056 -.434, .410
Numeracy .105 .129 .084 .811 -.151, .360
IQ .031 .127 .023 .241 -.221,.282
Risk Taking .688 .138 .485** 4.970 .414, .962
94
NumxRiskTak -.056 .182 -.033 -.310 -.416, .304
IQxRiskTak .075 .167 .045 .452 -.255, .406
Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total 
estimated intelligence, Risk Taking = DOSPERT Risk Taking, NumxRiskTak = 
interaction between numeracy and risk taking, IQxRiskTak = interaction between total 
estimated intelligence and risk taking.
a Unstandardized regression weight. Standardized beta weight.
*p < .05. ** p  <  .01.
Results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) did not significantly 
account for any of the variance in risky health decisions, R2 -  .072, R2acij = .056, F(2, 122) 
= 4.700,p  = .011, as the criterion o f significance p  < .00625 was employed. Results are 
presented in Table 9. In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated 
intelligence) and risk taking (attitude toward risk) significantly contributed to the amount 
of variance explained in risky health decisions, AR2=z .174, Fc/,a„ge(3, 119) = 9.140 ,p <  
.001. Risk taking (attitudes toward risk; p = .48,p <  .001) was positively related to risky 
health decisions, indicating that as risk taking increased, participants made more risky 
health decisions. In contrast, gender (P  = -.009,/? = .917), age (p = .006, p  = .949), 
numeracy (P  = .09,/? = .329), and total estimated intelligence (P  = .009, p  -  .918) did not 
significantly account for variance in risky health decisions. In the third step, the 
interactions between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and 
risk taking did not account for variance in health domain risky decisions, AR2 = .0 0 1 , 
Fchangei.2,117) = .105, = .900. Accordingly, participants with greater risk taking 
behavior made more risky health decisions. Given that the moderator variables did not 
account for variance in risky health decisions, hypothesis 4b was not supported.
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Hypothesis 4c
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, expected benefits o f risky 
health decisions will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and 
total estimated intelligence) and risky health decisions. No multivariate outliers were 
identified. The assumptions of normally distributed residuals, no multicollinearity, and 
independent errors were satisfied. The assumption of homoscedasticity was not satisfied. 
Regression analysis is argued to be robust to moderate violations of homoscedasticity and 
thus regression analysis was conducted (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971; Mertler & Vannatta, 
2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Results o f the moderation analysis are presented in 
Table 10.
Table 10
Expected Benefits as a Moderator o f  the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and 
Health Domain Risky Decisions
Variable R2 AR2 Bi3 SE B Pb t 95% Cl
Step 1 .090 .090*
Age - . 0 1 2 .005 -.213* -2.509 -.022, -.003
Gender -.419 .198 -.180* -2.119 -.810, -.028
Step 2 .153 .063*
Age -.009 .005 -.154 - 1 . 6 6 8 -.019, .002
Gender -.223 .207 -.095 -1.076 -.632,. 187
Numeracy .109 .117 .092 .932 -.122, .340
IQ .019 .115 .015 .165 -.209, .247
Expected .302 . 1 1 1 .248* 2.719 .082, .521
Benefits
Step 3 .155 .002
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Age -.009 .005 -.150 -1.597 -.019, .002
Gender - . 2 2 2 .209 -.095 -1.061 -.636,-192
Numeracy .104 .119 .087 .870 -.132, .339
IQ .025 .117 . 0 2 0 .215 -.206, .257
Expected
Benefits
.304 . 1 1 2 .249* 2.713 .082, .525
NumxExpBen - . 0 2 1 .124 -.015 -.169 -.267, .225
IQxExpBen .059 .118 .044 .497 -.174, .292
Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total 
estimated intelligence, Expected Benefits = DOSPERT Expected Benefits, NumxExpBen 
= interaction between numeracy and expected benefits, IQxExpBen = interaction between 
total estimated intelligence and expected benefits. 
a Unstandardized regression weight. b Standardized beta weight.
*p < .05.
The results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) accounted for 
9.0% of the variance in health domain risky decisions, R2 = .090, R2̂  = .076, F(2,130) = 
6.464, p  = .002, as presented in Table 10. In the first step, both age (P  = -.21,/? = .013) 
and gender (P  =  -. 18, p  = .036) had significant, negative relationships with risky health 
decisions. This indicates that males made more risky health related decisions than 
females and that younger adults made more risky health related decisions than older 
adults. In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) 
and expected benefits significantly contributed to variance explained in health domain 
risky decisions, AR2 = .063,/? = .028, F(5,127) = 4.596,/? < .001. Expected benefits ( P  = 
.24, p  ~ .007) had a positive relationship with risky health decisions, indicating that as 
perceived expected benefits of risky behavior increased, participants made more risky 
health decisions. However, age ( p  = -.15,/? = .098), gender ( P  = -.09,/? = .248), numeracy
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(P = .09, p  = .353), and total estimated intelligence (P = .01,/? = .869) were not 
significantly related to risky health decisions. In the third step, the interactions between 
cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and expected benefits did
•y
not add to the variance explained in health domain risky decisions, AR -  .002, Fchan̂ e(2, 
125) = .124,/? = .884. Based on these results, males and younger adults made more risky 
health decisions than females and older adults. Additionally, as expected benefits o f risky 
health decisions increased, participants made more risky health decisions. Given that the 
moderator did not significantly account for any o f the variance in risky health decisions, 
hypothesis 4c was not supported.
Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 stated that impulsivity will moderate the relationship between 
cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and domain-specific risky 
decisions.
Hypothesis 5a
After controlling for the effects of age and gender, trait impulsivity will moderate 
the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) 
and financial risky decisions. Nine multivariate outliers were identified. Moderation 
analysis was run with and without them to determine their influence on the overall model 
statistics. Multivariate outliers significantly affected the model statistic and were 
removed. The financial risk standardized residuals, D(124) = .097,/? = .006, Z skewness =
2.594, Zkurtosis = -1.102, were significantly non-normal and thus failed the assumption of 
normality. Accordingly, data were transformed using the square root transformation and 
reanalyzed for normality, D( 124) = .1 2 1 ,/? < .0 0 1 , Z skewness = - -783, Z kurtosis = - 2.835,
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which also failed the assumption for residual normality. Given the fact that the 
transformed data did not correct the non-normally distribution of the residuals, the 
untransformed data was used in this analysis. Although the data violated the assumption 
of normally distributed errors, regression analysis was conducted as several investigators 
argue that regression is robust to moderate violations o f residual normality (Borhntedt & 
Carter, 1971; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Results of the 
moderation analysis are presented in Table 11.
Table 11
Impulsivity as a Moderator o f  the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and Financial 
Domain Risky Decisions
Variable Rz AR1 B* SE B t 95% Cl
Step 1 .007 .007
Age .004 .004 .084 .922 -.004, .012
Gender -.053 .159 i © -.336 -.367, .261
Step 2 .042 .035
Age .003 .005 .065 .643 -.006, .012
Gender .031 .166 .018 .185 -.297, .359
Numeracy .175 .100 .191 1.741 -.024, .374
IQ -.049 .099 -.052 -.499 -.244, .146
Impulsivity .109 .097 .110 1.131 -.082, .301
Step 3 .058 .016
Age .004 .005 .086 .829 -.005, .013
Gender -.012 .169 -.007 -.070 -.346, .322
Numeracy .157 .101 .171 1.545 -.044, .358
IQ -.065 .099 -.068 -.650 -.261, .132
99
Impulsivity .126 .098 .127 1.289 -.067, .319
Numxlmpuls .035 .135 .029 .236 -.232, .303
IQxImpuls -.174 .134 -.145 -1.296 -.493, .092
Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy == numeracy, IQ = total
estimated intelligence, Impulsivity = trait impulsivity, Numxlmpuls = interaction 
between numeracy and impulsivity, IQxImpuls = interaction between total estimated 
intelligence and impulsivity.
a Unstandardized regression weight. b Standardized beta weight.
The results show that the control variables (age and gender) did not significantly 
account for any o f the variance in financial domain risky decisions, R2 = .007, R2̂  = 
.007, F(2, 121) = .450,/? = .638, as presented in Table 11. In the second step, cognitive 
abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and impulsivity did not significantly 
contributed to the amount o f variance explained in risky financial decisions, AR2 = .035, 
p  = .239, F(5 ,118 )=  1.037,/? = .399. In the third step, the interactions between cognitive 
abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and impulsivity did not significantly 
contribute to the amount o f variance explained in risky financial decisions, AR2 = .058, 
Fchangei2, 116) = .964,/? = .384. Based on these results, age, gender, cognitive abilities, 
and impulsivity do not explain variance in risky financial decisions. Accordingly, 
Hypothesis 5a was not supported.
Hypothesis 5b
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, trait impulsivity will moderate 
the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) 
and risky health decisions. Four multivariate outliers were identified. Regression analysis 
was run with and without these cases to determine the influence on the regression model.
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Multivariate outliers significantly affected the regression model and were removed. The 
assumptions of normally distributed residuals, no multicollinearity, and independent 
errors were satisfied. The assumption o f homoscedasticity was not satisfied. Regression 
analysis is argued to be robust to moderate violations o f homoscedasticity and thus 
regression analysis was conducted (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Results o f the moderation analysis are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12
Impulsivity as a Moderator o f  the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and Health 
Domain Risky Decisions
Variable R AR2 B* SE B Pb t 95% Cl
Step 1 .104 .104**
Age -.013 .005 -.223* -2.611 -.023, -.003
Gender -.469 . 2 0 0 -.2 0 0 * -2.346 -.865, -.073
Step 2 .179 .075*
Age -.009 .005 -.155 -1.704 -.019, .001
Gender -.356 .205 -.152 -1.735 -.762, .050
Numeracy .116 .117 .098 .989 -.116, .348
IQ .087 . 1 2 0 .068 .721 -.151,.325
Impulsivity .350 .111 .281* 3.156 .130, .559
Step 3 .187 .007
Age - . 0 1 0 .005 -.168 -1.809 -.0 2 0 , . 0 0 1
Gender -.307 . 2 1 1 -.131 -1.455 -.726, .111
Numeracy . 1 2 2 .118 .103 1.029 -.113, .356
IQ .087 . 1 2 1 .069 .722 -.152, .327
Impulsivity .330 .113 .265* 2.927 .107, .553
Numxlmpuls
IQxImpuls
-.020 .147 -.014 -.136 -.311,.271
.130 .142 .096 .920 -.150, .411
Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total 
estimated intelligence, Impulsivity = trait impulsivity, Numxlmpuls = interaction 
between numeracy and impulsivity, IQxImpuls = interaction between total estimated 
intelligence and impulsivity.
a Unstandardized regression weight.b Standardized beta weight.
*p <  .05. ** p  <  .01.
The results show that the control variables (age and gender) accounted for 10.4%
9 9of the variance in health domain risky decisions, R = . 104, R adj= -090, F(2,126) = 
7.309,/? = .001, as presented in Table 12. In the first step, both age (P  =  -.22, p  = .010) 
and gender (P  = -.20,/? = .021) had negative relationships with health domain risky 
decisions. This indicates that males made more risky health related decisions than 
females and that younger adults made more risky health-related decisions than older 
adults. In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence)
. . .  9
and trait impulsivity explained significant variance in health domain nsky decisions, AR 
-  .075,/? = .013, F(5,123) = 5.377, p <  .001. Trait impulsivity (P  = .281,/? = .002) was 
positively related to risky health decisions, such that as trait impulsivity increased, 
participants made more risky health decisions. However, age (P  — -.15,/?=  .091), gender 
( p  = -.15,/? = .085), numeracy (P  = .09,/? = .325), and total estimated intelligence (P  = 
.06,/? = .472) did not significantly account for variance in risky health decisions. In the 
third step, the interactions between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated 
intelligence) and impulsivity did not add to the variance explained in health domain risky
'y
decisions, AR = .007, Fc/,a„ge( 2 , 121) = .541 ,p  = .584. Based on the preceding results, 
males and younger adults made more risky health decisions than females and older
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adults. Additionally, participants with greater trait impulsivity made more risky health 
decisions. Given that the moderator did not significantly account for variance in risky 
health decisions, hypothesis 5b was not supported.
Posthoc Analyses
An independent samples /-test assessed whether the older and younger adults 
differed on self-reported levels o f trait impulsivity. The groups significantly differed on 
self-reported trait impulsivity, /(127) = 4.337, p  < .001, r = .359, A/younger= 2.739; Moider 
-  1.952, where the younger adults had higher levels o f trait impulsivity than older adults. 
An independent samples /-test assessed whether males and females differed on self- 
reported levels of trait impulsivity. The groups did not significantly differ in levels of 
self-reported trait impulsivity, /(126) = 1.414,/? = .160, r=  .124, Â Maies= 2.716; Mpemales 
= 2.498.
A one-way ANOVA tested whether older and younger adults significantly 
differed on their risk perception, risk taking, and perceived expected benefits o f engaging 
in risky behavior. Older and younger adults significantly differed on all aspects o f risk 
tolerance as measured by the DOSPERT subscales. Homogeneity o f variance was not 
assumed for hypothetical risk taking behavior, F ( l, 127) = 10.986, p  -  .001. Thus, the 
Welch’s F  statistic was used to assess group differences. Welch’s F (l, 79.678) = 89.203, 
p  < .001, r =.475, A/oider= 26.42, Monger = 36.11, which indicates that the younger 
adults were more likely to take hypothetical risks based on various risk taking scenarios 
than older adults. Older adults perceived greater risk in various health and financial- 
related risky scenarios than younger adults, F ( l, 127) = 19.578,/? < .001, r = .365, Moider 
= 66.63, Myounger= 59.55. Similarly, younger adults perceived greater possible benefits of
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engaging in risky decision-making than older adults, F (l, 127) = 20.364,/? < .001, r =
.371, A/oider= 5.061; Myounger= 5.671. A one-way ANOVA assessed whether males and 
females significantly differed on risk perception, risk taking behavior, and expected 
benefits o f engaging in risky behavior. Males and females also significantly differed on 
all aspects o f risk tolerance as measured by the DOSPERT subscales. Males and females 
significantly differed on hypothetical risk taking behavior, F(2,126) = 12.411,/? < .001, r 
= .405, MMaies = 38.30, A/femaies = 31.85, showing that males had a greater likelihood of 
domain-specific risk taking behavior than females. The groups also significantly differed 
on risk perception, F(2, 126) = 8.943,/? < .001, r = .352, A/Maies= 57.57, A/pemaies “  62.88, 
revealing that females perceived greater risk in each domain-specific risky scenario than 
males. Finally, males perceived greater possible benefits from engaging in domain- 
specific risky behavior than females, F(2,126) = 4.482,/? = .013, r -  .257, A/Maies =
5.761, A/females — 5.433.
The Mann-Whitney test examined whether older and younger adults significantly 
differed on numeracy and measures o f nonverbal intelligence. The reverse square root 
numeracy and block score variables were used as data were significantly, negatively 
skewed. Accordingly, results must be reverse interpreted such that lower scores indicate 
greater numeric and nonverbal intelligence. Groups significantly differed on numeracy, 
U= 808.0, z  = -2.762, p  = .006, r = -.243, where older adults (M =  46.17) scored 
significantly higher on numeracy than younger adults ( M -  69.30). In contrast, the groups 
did not differ in nonverbal intelligence, U = 1254.50, z = -.33, p  = .973, r = -.029, M0/*r = 
65.23 and M Younger = 64.95. A one-way ANOVA tested whether age groups differed on 
measures o f verbal and overall intelligence. The groups did not differ in verbal
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intelligence, F( 1,127) -  .984, p  -  .323, Moider ~ 10.365 and Myounger ~ 10.243, or in 
overall intelligence, F ( l, 127) = .16b,p  = .383, Moider= 10.404 and Myounger = 10.293.
The Mann-Whitney test assessed whether males and females significantly differed 
on numeracy and measures o f nonverbal intelligence. The reverse square root numeracy 
and block score variables were used as the data were significantly, negatively skewed. 
Lower scores indicated greater performance on measures o f numeracy and nonverbal 
intelligence than higher scores. Males (M = 52.79) scored higher than females (M =
72.01) on numeracy, U= 1364.50, z = -2.887,/? = .004, r = -.254. However, males and 
females did not significantly differ in nonverbal intelligence, U= 1680.50, z = -1.318,/? = 
.188, r = -.116. A one-way ANOVA tested whether males and females differed on 
measures o f verbal and overall intelligence. They did not differ in verbal intelligence,
F (2 ,126) = 1.423,/? = .051 ,M Maies -  10.381 and MFemaies = 10.204, or in overall 




The purpose of this study was to examine the moderating effects o f trait 
impulsivity and risk tolerance (risk taking, risk perception, and expected benefits o f risky 
behavior) on the relationship between cognitive abilities (intelligence and numeric 
ability) and domain-specific risky decision-making (financial and health), after 
controlling for age and gender. Additionally, this study sought to examine gender and age 
related differences in domain specific risky decision-making. The participants o f this 
study were 133 adults, split into two age groups: younger adults (N  = 108; 81.2%) age 18 
-  30 years, and older adults (N  = 25; 18.8%) age 55 -  83 years.
Gender Differences in Risky Decision-Making
Hypothesis 1 stated that males and females would differ in the number o f domain- 
specific risky decisions they made. Males made more risky financial and health decisions 
than females. These gender differences in risky decision-making are consistent with 
published results in the risky decision-making literature (Byrnes et al., 2009; Chamess & 
Gneezy, 2012). Specifically, males and females significantly differed on all aspects of 
risk propensity on the DOSPERT subscales (risk taking, risk perception, and expected 
benefits), where males endorsed more risk taking behavior and expected greater possible 
benefits or enjoyment o f such risky behavior than females. Relative to men, however, 
women perceived greater potential risk in various risky health and finance scenarios.
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Several investigators have examined further the consistent gender differences in 
risk perception and have found that these judgments are based upon different factors for 
males and females. When possible severe negative consequences are present in a risky 
decision, males are more likely to engage in risk taking behavior than females. Closer 
examination has revealed that for females, probability of incurring negative consequences 
as well as perceived severity o f such consequences affects the risky decision-making 
process. Moreover, probability of incurring and estimated severity o f negative 
consequences appear to be stable and significant deterrents o f risky decision-making for 
females from childhood through at least early adulthood (Harris et al., 2006; Hillier & 
Morrongiello, 1998). In the present study, probability of incurring negative consequences 
and perceptions o f severity of risky decisions were not measured.
Age Differences in Risky Decision-Making
Hypothesis 2 stated that older and younger adults would differ in the number of 
domain-specific risky decisions they made. Younger adults made more risky financial 
and health decisions than older adults. Older and younger adults also differed on all 
aspects o f risk propensity (risk taking, risk perception, and expected benefits o f risky 
behavior). Specifically, younger adults had more risk taking behavior, expected more 
possible benefits or enjoyment o f such behavior, and less perceived risk associated with 
risk taking behavior compared to older adults. These findings are also consistent with the 
literature on age differences in risky decision-making. For instance, Rolison, Hanoch, 
Wood, and Liu (2013) found that relative to younger adults, older adults make fewer 
risky health and financial decisions. Moreover, age-related changes in health risk taking 
tend to decline smoothly over time, whereas financial risk taking seems to sharply decline
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with age. Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin, and Hertwig (2011) argued that there are age- 
related changes in motivations toward loss prevention, where older adults are more likely 
to make choices that prevent loss than younger adults. It is also likely that there are 
domain-specific differences in the impact that generational changes and lived historical 
events, such as economic booms and busts, have on risk taking behavior (Rolison et al., 
2013).
Mata et al. (2011) argue that age-related differences in risky decision-making are 
related to the type o f decisional task. When participants were provided with complete 
descriptive information about probabilities and outcomes, younger adults made more 
risky decisions than older adults, a finding replicated in this study. It is possible that 
these findings highlight proposed differences in how older and younger adults process 
risk communications when making risky decisions (Li et al., 2013).
Age Differences in Cognitive Abilities
In this sample, older adults significantly outperformed younger adults on 
measures o f numeracy, but not on intelligence, despite the significant correlations among 
intelligence and numeracy. In the present study, fluid or nonverbal intelligence was 
measured using a block design task, which assessed the ability to manipulate and 
transform information while utilizing visual-spatial and working memory abilities, all of 
which underlie solving mathematical problems (Shipley et al., 2009). Previous research 
has indicated that crystalized or verbal intelligence tends to increase with age, while fluid 
intelligence tends to decrease (Li et al., 2013). Given these reported age-related changes 
in cognitive abilities, younger adults should have outperformed the older adults on 
measures of numeracy. There are several possible explanations for these findings. The
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most likely explanation is that the older adults in this study possess greater numeric 
ability than their age-related peers who have been included in previous studies. Another 
possibility is that the group level measure o f numeracy was biased, as females performed 
more poorly than males on measures of numeracy and females comprised 60% of the 
younger adult sample.
In the present study, numeric ability was not related to the overall number o f risky 
health and financial decisions. Previous research has indicated that numeric ability affects 
a decision-maker’s ability to comprehend information and make competent decisions 
(Lipkus et al., 2001; Schwartz et al., 1997). For instance, Schwartz et al. (1997) found 
that numeric ability was related to the application of risk information, where participants 
with less numeric ability made less accurate decisions about relative risk. Further,
Lipkus et al. (2001) found that even well-educated adults experience difficulty 
interpreting risk communication when mathematical information was part of the risk 
message. What is less clear however, is whether numeric ability leads one to make more 
or less risky decisions, as researchers have primarily investigated the effects o f numeracy 
on decision-making competence. One explanation for the current findings may be that 
other factors, such as trait impulsivity, more significantly affected the participants’ risky 
decision-making process and that numeric ability differentially led to some participants to 
make more risky decisions, while others made fewer risky decisions.
Moderators of the Effect of Cognitive Abilities on Risky 
Health and Financial Decision-Making
The present study adds to the domain-specific risky decision-making literature as 
it is the only known study to this investigator to examine the moderating effects o f risk
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propensity (risk perception, risk taking, and expected benefits) and trait impulsivity on 
the relationship between cognitive abilities (intelligence and numeric ability) and risky 
financial and health decision-making. Previous research indicates that there is a 
relationship between cognitive abilities, such as intelligence and numeracy, and decision­
making (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Del Missier et al., 2012; Finucane et al., 2005; Li et 
al., 2013). Some investigators argue that risk propensity may alter the relative salience of 
aspects o f risk communication, such as relative gains and losses, thus affecting the ways 
in which risky decisions are processed (Sitkin & Weingat, 1995). Similarly, impulsivity 
may affect the type of decision-making strategy that is utilized, leading one to make 
affectively driven decisions rather than deliberate analytical decisions (Penolazzi et al., 
2012). It was hypothesized that measures of risk propensity (risk taking, risk perception, 
and expected benefits) and trait impulsivity would moderate the relationship between 
cognitive abilities and domain-specific risky decision-making (see hypotheses 3-5).
All moderation analyses in this study were non-significant; however, all 
moderator variables (risk taking, risk perception, expected benefits, and impulsivity) 
individually accounted for variance in domain-specific risky decisions. Specifically, 
hypothesis 3 stated that attitudes toward risk, risk perception, and expected benefits of 
risky behavior would moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities and risky 
financial decisions. The results o f this study did not support this hypothesis. One 
possible explanation for this finding is that risky financial decision-making was measured 
inadequately in this study as risky scenarios were created and yielded poor internal 
consistency reliabilities. Thus, it is likely that the scenarios were measuring different 
aspects o f risky financial decision-making, creating much variance in the data. Similar
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studies o f risky financial decision-making have typically utilized gambling paradigms 
and had participants make one type o f risky financial decision. It is also possible that the 
participants o f this study were equally exposed to some aspects o f younger adults in this 
sample had little exposure to risky financial decision-making, thus creating more 
variability in response due to inexperience or poor understanding of the task.
Hypothesis 4 stated that attitudes toward risk, risk perception, and expected 
benefits o f risky behavior would moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities 
and risky health decisions. The results o f this study did not support this hypothesis. There 
are several possible explanations for this finding. Again, risky health decision-making 
was measured using risky scenarios that were created and yielded poor internal 
consistency reliability. O f note, the scenarios used in this study were designed to measure 
health and safety decisions, which may be too distinct to measure together. Additionally, 
items were written to induce high issue involvement to elicit deliberative processing. It is 
possible that these hypothetical scenarios did not elicit high issue involvement as 
expected and led to affectively based decisions, thus increasing overall response 
variability.
Hypothesis 5 stated that impulsivity would moderate the relationship between 
cognitive abilities and risky health and financial decisions. The results o f this study did 
not support this hypothesis. It is possible that trait impulsivity is not severe enough to 
interrupt the decision-making process. Similarly, it is possible that the adults sampled in 
this study are unrepresentative o f the larger older and younger adult populations, as these 
participants consisted o f university students and community dwelling individuals, both of 
whom theoretically possess greater intellectual abilities than the public. Thus, it is
I l l
possible that greater cognitive abilities buffer the impact o f trait impulsivity on decision­
making processes.
Another likely explanation for these moderation findings is that incorrect 
theoretical and statistical models were employed. Specifically, it is possible that a 
curvilinear relationship exists between the proposed independent, dependent, and 
moderating variables. For instance, it is possible that as measures o f intelligence and 
numeracy increase, so does domain-specific risky decision-making up to a certain point, 
at which time participants may become more risk averse. It is also possible that measures 
of risk propensity and impulsivity do not moderate the relationship between cognitive 
abilities and risky decision-making. Some investigators have found that risk perception 
and risk propensity mediate the relationship between risky decision outcome history, 
problem framing, and risky decision-making behavior (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). 
Similarly, Harris et al. (2006) found that risk perception, risk taking, and expected 
benefits of risky behavior all significantly and partially mediated the relationship between 
gender and risky health and gambling decisions. Thus, it is possible that trait impulsivity 
and risk propensity (risk taking, risk perception, and expected benefits) mediate the 
relationships between cognitive abilities and risky health and financial decisions.
Although the moderation analyses were not significant, each moderator variable 
significantly accounted for some variance in domain-specific risky decision-making, 
which is consistent with published findings (Byrnes et al., 1999; Crone et al., 2003;
Harris et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002). When examining the overall amount o f risky 
decisions made, males and younger adults made more risky decisions than females and 
younger adults; however, for risky financial decisions, age and gender did not
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significantly account for variance in risky decision-making. This finding is inconsistent 
with previous research that has found significant interactions between age and gender 
when examining risky financial decisions, where younger and middle aged men 
evidenced greater risk taking attitudes about financial risks than women. By older 
adulthood, however, this gap had significantly reduced and men endorsed less financial 
risk taking, bringing their risk taking attitudes more in line with those o f older adult 
women (Rolison et al., 2013). One possible explanation for this finding is that financial 
decision-making was measured more broadly in the current study than in previous 
studies, which have primarily used gambling tasks to measure risky financial decision­
making.
For health related risky decisions, age and gender accounted for variance in risky 
health decisions. This finding is consistent with previous research that has found an age 
by gender interaction in risky health decisions, where older adults make fewer risky 
health decisions and the amount o f risky health decisions reduced more steeply for men 
over time than for women (Rolison et al., 2013). Some investigators argue that women 
are generally more cognizant o f health risks and engage in greater preventative behavior 
than men (Rolison et al., 2013). Additionally, it is possible that there are generational 
differences in risk taking, as things that are considered risky to a younger generation may 
not be considered risky to older adults. Given the differences across decisional domains, 
these findings also provide support for contemporary theories o f domain-specific risky 
decisions-making (Blais & Weber, 2006; Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002).
Trait impulsivity accounted for a significant amount o f variance in risky health 
decisions, where participants with greater trait impulsivity made more risky health
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decisions. The majority o f literature regarding the relationship between impulsivity and 
risky decision-making has utilized gambling paradigms and has thus examined risky 
financial decisions (Davis et al., 2007; Crone et al., 2003). Within these models, there 
appears to be a trend where individuals that are more impulsive make more risky 
decisions. Interestingly, trait impulsivity did not account for any o f the variance in risky 
financial decisions in the present study. It is unclear as to why trait impulsivity only 
significantly affected risky health decisions and not financial decisions. One significant 
difference between this study design and those in the literature pertains to the way in 
which participants made risky financial decisions. In the present study, a descriptive 
forced choice risky scenarios paradigm was employed, while much o f the previous 
research has used gambling tasks (Davis et al., 2007; Penolazzi et al., 2012). Thus, it is 
possible that the way in which risky financial decision-making was measured led to these 
inconsistent findings.
It is also possible that trait impulsivity as measured in this study was not severe 
enough to disrupt the decision-making process across various decisional domains. While 
some investigators (Penolazzi et al., 2012) have found that higher scores on measures of 
trait impulsivity such as the I7 disrupt the risky decision-making process, participants of 
this study scored within the average range on the I7 as compared to the general population 
across the adult lifespan (Eysenck et al., 1985). Moreover, 18% of this sample reported 
that they had previously been diagnosed with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD), which is consistent with national rates o f ADHD (Chamorro et al., 2012). 
Although participants were not asked to report whether or not they currently take any 
prescription medication to help manage symptoms o f ADHD, it is possible that
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symptoms are well managed and groups means on measures of trait impulsivity were 
elevated due to well manage clinical impulsivity. Given the instability o f the effects of 
trait impulsivity on domain-specific risky decision-making, it is also possible that these 
findings provide further support for the domain-specific risk taking theory.
Both risk taking and expected benefits had significant, positive relationships with 
risky financial and health decisions, indicating that as attitudes toward risk (risk taking) 
and expected benefits or enjoyment of risky behavior increased, participants made more 
risky health and financial decisions. Previous research has found that both o f these factors 
impact risky decision-making, yet also note consistent gender differences where males 
endorse more risk taking and expected benefits than females (Harris et al., 2006; Weber 
et al., 2002). In this study, gender was a significant contributor to health but not financial 
decisions. Similarly, risk perception and gender did not account for risky decisions in 
financial domain, which is not consistent with previous literature that has cited strong 
gender differences in risk perception (Harris et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002). One 
possible explanation for these findings is that participants did not understand the all o f the 
risky financial decisions, thus leading to greater variability in response. It is also possible 
that participants did not experience high issue involvement when making these decisions 
and engaged in more affectively driven decision-making.
The lack o f consistency regarding the influence of various personal factors across 
decisional domains provides evidence in support o f the domain-specific risky decision­
making theory; otherwise, we would expect to see findings that are more consistent 
across decisional domains, gender, and age o f participants. Furthermore, these findings 
suggest that various personal factors do affect the risky decision-making process. Two
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likely explanations for these inconsistent findings are that the model used to understand 
these relationships was incorrect and that poor internal consistency reliability o f the 
outcome measure led to significant variation in responses.
Practical and Clinical Implications
The findings o f this study yield both practical and clinical implications.
Practically speaking, understanding the ways in which various personal factors affect the 
risky decision-making process will allow for more effective risk communication, leading 
to greater comprehension and competent decision-making. For instance, much risk 
communication is presented in the form of percentages, probabilities, and proportions. 
Research indicates that even well-educated people experience difficulty converting and 
appropriately applying this type o f risk communication, thus reducing decision-making 
competence. Moreover, there are age and gender differences in numeric and cognitive 
abilities, which also affect one’s ability to make competent decisions (Finucane & 
Gullion; Schwartz et al., 1997). These difficulties may be exacerbated when other 
personal factors, such as impulsivity and risk propensity, influence the ways in which risk 
communication is processed.
Given the current demographic trends, adults are living longer and are faced with 
increasing numbers o f risky financial and health decisions than ever before. Some 
investigators have found that older adults are more sensitive to the presentation of 
information, which affects their decision-making competence (Finucane et al., 2002). 
When decision-making competence is threatened, people are at risk o f making poor 
decisions or deferring decisions to younger care providers, such as adult children. 
Accordingly, understanding the ways in which older and younger adults are differentially
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affected by risk propensity and impulsivity when making risky decisions can allow for 
greater specificity o f risk communication. Tailored risk communication may provide 
opportunities for older adults to remain competent in their decision-making as long as 
possible, thus respecting individual autonomy. Tailored risk communication can also 
reduce some o f the burden experienced by adult caregivers o f older parents.
Within applied health and mental health fields, better understanding o f risky 
decision-making can allow providers greater opportunity to assess decision-making 
competence, which may have direct effects on treatment. For instance, in the field of 
applied clinical or counseling psychology, therapists are required to explain the potential 
risks and benefits o f treatment prior to obtaining consent to treatment. Theoretically 
speaking, if  clients cannot understand risk communication, then they cannot provide true 
consent to treatment, thus violating ethical practice (American Psychological 
Association, 2010). Again, understanding how to tailor risk communication can allow 
for greater decision-making competence and respect for autonomy of risky decision­
making.
Limitations
There are a few important limitations o f this study that must be addressed. Although 
the overall sample size (N=  133) exceeded the suggested minimum sample based on 
various power and design estimates (N> 106), the vast majority o f the sample consisted 
o f college students and thus may be unrepresentative of the larger population. 
Specifically, the final older adult sample consisted o f 26 (18.4%) adults between the ages 
o f 55-89 years, which is approximately one-third o f the original target sample (N= 75).
Consequently, this small sample size limits generalizability o f these results to adults over 
the age o f 55 years.
The older adult sample consisted of adults who were recruited from two separate 
fitness programs, one in the southern United States and one in the Midwestern United 
States. Although research indicates that older adults who engage in regular exercise may 
be more similar than dissimilar (Boyette et al., 2002), it is possible that geographical 
location may have an impact on factors that affect risky decision-making. Research also 
indicates that older adults who engage in fitness programs differ significantly from those 
adults who do not participate in such programs. For instance, Boyette et al. (2002) found 
that older adults who participate in regular exercise are typically more highly educated, o f 
higher socioeconomic status (SES), and are in better overall physical health than those 
adults who do not. Moreover, some investigators suggest a link between exercise and 
cognition: older adults who engage in regular exercise tend to outperform sedentary older 
adults on components o f executive functioning, including reasoning, working memory, 
reaction time (Clarkson-Smith & Hartley, 1989), multi-tasking, planning, and inhibition 
(Hillman, Erickson, & Kramer, 2008; Voss, Nagamatsu, Liu-Ambrose, & Kramer, 2011).
Results of neuroimaging studies also indicate that regular physical exercise may lead 
to structural and functional changes in localized brain regions that are responsible for 
executive functioning and overall cognitive abilities (Guiney & Machado, 2013). These 
findings suggest that older adults who engage in physical exercise differ on a variety o f 
demographic factors, such as SES, educational background and cognitive abilities from 
those who do not exercise. It is likely that the older adults o f this study represent a subset 
o f older adults that may be of greater physical and cognitive functioning than other
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samples, such as those who do not participate in regular physical exercise. Thus, the 
results o f this study as they pertain to older adults should be generalized with caution, as 
the sample size was small and not representative of diversity o f older adults. Future 
research should include a more heterogeneous sample o f older adults that are 
representative o f the larger population.
Given that research has found links between physical exercise and cognitive abilities, 
exercise habits of all study participants should have been assessed; however, the exercise 
habits of the young adults were not. Research regarding the cognitive effects o f regular 
exercise among young adults is less available and findings are mixed (Hillman et al., 
2008; Voss et al., 2011), with some studies supporting increases in working memory, 
reaction time, selective attention, and inhibitory control (Guiney & Machado, 2013), all 
o f which may significantly affect one’s decision-making abilities. Future research should 
solicit information about exercise habits as well as assess how such habits may influence 
the risky decision-making process.
Another limitation is that the younger adults were sampled from undergraduate 
psychology classes at a southern American university. Grohol (2010) notes that this 
longstanding tradition o f oversampling college youth within psychological research is 
often done out of convenience, cost restraints, tradition, and “good enough” data that can 
be generalized to the larger population. Similarly, Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 
(2010) argue that college students represent a "WEIRD; Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic" sample that is often vastly different from the larger 
population o f less educated Americans. For instance, Turkheimer, Haley, Waldron, 
D ’Onofrio, and Gottesman (2003) found that the influence o f environment and genetics
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on intelligence differ based on socioeconomic status, where for children raised in lower- 
SES areas, environment accounted for approximately 60% of the variance in intelligence 
and the genetic influence was almost zero. Opposing results were found among children 
who were raised in high-SES environments. Given the financial and scholastic 
requirements to get into college, it is likely that the majority of this study sample is from 
middle to upper-SES backgrounds and o f average to above average intelligence. Thus, 
future research should include a more heterogeneous sample of young adults.
Another limitation pertains to how risky health and financial decisions were 
measured. Rather than having participants engage in real risky decision-making, such as a 
gambling task, participants were required to make a dichotomous forced choice decision 
based on hypothetical scenarios. Although scenarios were written to have high issue 
involvement, it is likely that these scenarios elicited less involvement than a real risky 
decision with consequences, such as winning or losing money in a gambling task. 
Additionally, the health and financial outcome measures yielded very low scale 
reliabilities, falling into a range that is considered unacceptable. Low scale reliabilities 
indicate that individual items within a scale are measuring different constructs and thus 
lack internal consistency. Given that the individual items on the health and financial risky 
decision-making measures were written to tap various types of risk, including disease 
prevention, medical treatment, injury prevention, financial investment, saving and 
spending, and gambling, it is not surprising that the scales yielded low reliabilities. Future 
research should measure risky financial and health decision-making with real world risky 
tasks or use measures with greater scale reliability. For instance, future investigation
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could require participants to make risky decisions regarding food choice after being 
provided with information regarding the impact o f dietary choices on health.
Similarly, this study measured personal factors (intelligence, numeracy, 
impulsiveness), risk tolerance (risk taking, risk perception, and expected benefits), and 
risky decision-making via self-report measures. Although self-report measures are useful 
ways of tapping into a respondent’s inner psychological processes, they can also add to 
measurement error and produce distorted results (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). For instance, research on affective 
forecasting has shown that participants regularly make prediction errors about how they 
will react and feel (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Similarly, research on judgment and 
decision-making has found that when participants make risky gambling decisions in a 
hypothetical scenario that they are much less risk averse than when they make similar 
risky decisions with real currency (Holt & Laury, 2002). Finally, self-report measures 
may be more vulnerable to processes such as socially desirable responding, item social 
desirability, and item complexity and/or ambiguity, which may further distort results 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003).
It is widely accepted among scholars that parametric statistics such as those used in 
this study should adhere to parametric assumptions, as these assumptions allow for 
generalizability o f results (Field, 2009; Osborne & Waters, 2002; Tabachnick & Fidel, 
2013; Williams, Grajales, & Kurkiewicz, 2013). Although violations o f parametric 
assumptions may not invalidate statistical findings, they may weaken results and thus 
greatly reduce the generalizability o f findings beyond the original study sample 
(Bohmstedt & Carter, 1971; Tabachnick & Fidel, 2013). In this study, several o f the
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parametric assumptions for multiple regression analysis were violated, thus limiting the 
applicability o f these findings beyond the sample tested.
Implications for Future Research
Both the results and limitations o f this study provide useful insights for future 
research into the risky decision-making process. First, future research should explore 
domain-specific decision-making processes across the adult lifespan to better understand 
the stability, or lack thereof, o f decision-making processes. To date, a few studies 
including the present study, have examined age differences in risky decision-making via 
cross-sectional designs; however, longitudinal data is lacking. Thus, future research 
should examine domain-specific risky decision-making across the adult lifespan utilizing 
within-subjects longitudinal designs. Moreover, heterogeneous samples o f adults should 
be included in order to increase generalizability o f findings.
Some investigators have found consistent gender differences in the ways in which 
males and females perceive and determine relative risk (Harris et al., 2006; Hillier & 
Morrongiello; 1998). Determinants o f risk perception, such as the probability o f incurring 
negative consequences and perceptions o f severity o f possible consequences have been 
studied more thoroughly in children and young adults; however, little is known about the 
stability o f these gender differences through middle and older age. Additionally, research 
that has investigated risk perception in older age has used cross-sectional research 
designs, which do not provide information about the stability of such determinants. Thus, 
future research should investigate determinants o f risk perception through the adult 
lifespan using longitudinal designs to better understand how risk perception affects 
domain-specific risky decision-making across the lifespan.
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It is also believed that emotions significantly affect the ways in which people 
make risky decisions. Furthermore, some investigators argue that emotional processing 
changes throughout the lifespan and may therefore differentially affect the decision­
making process for older and younger adults (Rolison et al., 2013). Future research 
should include measures o f emotional processing when examining domain-specific risky 
decision-making processes in order to better understand how it affects different types of 
risky decisions.
Finally, future research should examine the effects o f personal factors, such as 
risk propensity and impulsivity on domain-specific risky decision-making processes. 
When possible, these studies should engage participants in making real world risky 
decisions that yield actual relative consequences, such as gambling to win or lose money 
because designs will mimic most closely actual risky decision-making.
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Please answer each of the following questions. For multiple choice questions, select the 
most appropriate response.
1- A ge:_______
2. Gender (please circle one): Male Female Transgender Other
3. If you chose “Other” above, please explain:
4. Ethnicity (please circle one): African American/Black Asian Caucasian/White 
Hispanic Native American Other
5. If you chose “Other” above, please explain:
6 . Current marital status: Single Married Divorced Widowed
7. How many children do you have?________
8 . What is the highest level o f education that you have received (please circle one):
None Elementary High school or equivalent Some college/university 
Associate’s degree Bachelor’s degree Master’s degree Ph.D. degree
9. What is your current student classification (please circle one):
Freshman Junior Sophomore Senior
10. Are you currently employed? Yes No
11. What is your approximate annual household income (please circle one):
Less than $10,000 $10,001 -  $19,999 $20, 000 -  $35,000 $35,001 -  
$41,999 $42,000-$51,999 $52,000 -  $58,999 $59,000 -  $73,999 $74,000 
-$100,000 $100,001 -$200,000 More than $200,0
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12. Using the 5-point scale below, how financially-independent are you? That is, how 
much do you pay for your own room and board, tuition, groceries, bills, etc. 



















13. Using the 5-point scale below, where do you fall on the liberal-conservative 













14. Using the 5-point scale below, where do you fall on the continuum of 
religiousness? I am
1--------------------------------- 2---------------------------- 3--------------------------- 4--------------------------- 5
Extremely Slightly Not religious Slightly Extremely





Instructions: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the ‘YES’ or the 
‘NO’ following the questions. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick 
questions. Work quickly and do not think too long about the exact meaning o f the 
question.
PLEASE REMEMBER TO ANSWER EACH QUESTION
1. Would you enjoy water skiing?
2. Usually do you prefer to stick to brands you know are reliable, to trying new ones 
on the chance o f finding something better?
3. Would you feel sorry for a lonely stranger?
4. Do you quite enjoy taking risks?
5. Do you often get emotionally involved with your friends’ problems?
6 . Would you enjoy parachute jumping?
7. Do you often buy things on impulse?
8 . Do unhappy people who are sorry for themselves irritate you?
9. Do you generally do and say things without stopping to think?
10. Are you inclined to get nervous when others around you seem to be nervous?
11. Do you often get into a jam because you do things without thinking?
12. Do you think hitch-hiking is too dangerous a way to travel?
13. Do you find it silly for people to cry out o f happiness?
14. Do you like diving off the highboard?
15. Do people you are with have a strong influence on your moods?
16. Are you an impulsive person?
17. Do you welcome new and exciting experiences and sensations, even if they are a 
little frightening and unconventional?
18. Does it affect you very much when one o f your friends seems upset?
19. Do you usually think carefully before doing anything?
20. Would you like to leam to fly an aeroplane?
21. Do you ever get deeply involved with the feelings of a character in a film, play or 
novel?
22. Do you often do things on the spur of the moment?
23. Do you get very upset when you see someone cry?
24. Do you sometimes find someone else’s laughter catching?
25. Do you mostly speak without thinking things out?
26. Do you often get involved in things you later wish you could get out of?
27. Do you get so ‘carried away’ by new and exciting ideas that you never think of 
possible snags?
28. Do you find it hard to understand people who risk their necks climbing 
mountains?
29. Can you make decisions without worrying about other people’s feelings?
30. Do you sometimes like doing things that are a bit frightening?
31. Do you need to use a lot o f self-control to keep out o f trouble?
32. Do you become more irritated than sympathetic when you see someone cry?
33. Would you agree that almost everything enjoyable is illegal or immoral?
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34. Generally do you prefer to enter cold sea water gradually, to diving or jumping 
straight in?
35. Are you often surprised at people’s reactions to what you do or say?
36. Would you enjoy the sensation o f skiing very fast down a high mountain slope?
37. Do you like watching people open presents?
38. Do you think an evening out is more successful if  it is unplanned or arranged at 
the last moment?
39. Would you like to go scuba diving?
40. Would you find it very hard to break bad news to someone?
41. Would you enjoy fast driving?
42. Do you usually work quickly, without bothering to check?
43. Do you often change your interests?
44. Before making up your mind, do you consider all the advantages and 
disadvantages?
45. Can you get very interested in your friends’ problems?
46. Would you like to go pot-holing?
47. Would you be put off a job involving quite a bit o f danger?
48. Do you prefer to ‘sleep on it’ before making decisions?
49. When people shout at you, do you shout back?
50. Do you feel sorry for very shy people?
51. Are you happy when you are with a cheerful group and sad when the others are 
glum?
52. Do you usually make up your mind quickly?
53. Can you imagine what it must be like to be very lonely?
54. Does it worry you when others are worrying and panicky?
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For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would 
engage in the described activity or behavior, if  you were to find yourself in that situation.
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each 
activity or behavior. Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale:
j 2 3 4 5
Very Unlikely Not sure Likely Very
unlikely likely
1. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (F)__________________________________
2. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (F)  ___
3. Drinking heavily at a social function. (H/S) _____
4. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. (F) _____
5. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (F) _____
6. Betting a day’s income on the outcome o f a sporting event
(e.g., baseball, soccer, or football). (F) _____
7. Investing 5% of your annual income in a dependable and
conservative stock. (F) _____
8 . Engaging in unprotected sex. (H/S) _____
9. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. (H/S) _____
10. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. (F) _____
11. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. (H/S)_____________________________ _____
12. Gambling a week’s income at a casino. (F)_____________________________ _____
13. Sunbathing without sunscreen. (H/S)____________________________________ _____
14. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area o f town. (H/S)______________ _____
15. Eating high cholesterol foods. (H/S)__________________________________ _____
16. Driving while taking medication that may make you drowsy. (H/S)_____________
Note. F = Financial and H/S = Health/Safety
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Risk Perception Scale
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the outcome 
or consequences will be and for which there is the possibility o f negative consequences. 
However, riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion, and we are interested in your 
gut level assessment of how risky each situation or behavior is.
For each o f the following statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each 
situation. Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale:
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all Moderately Extremely risky
risky risky
Expected Benefits Scale
For each o f the following statements, please indicate the benefits you would obtain from 
each situation. Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale:
1 2 3 4 5







1. Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up even (2 ,4 , or 6 ) ? __________
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize is 1%. What is 
your best guess about how many people would win a $ 1 0 . 0 0  prize if  1 , 0 0 0  people each 
buy a single ticket to BIG BUCKS?__________
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance o f winning a car is 1 in 
1,000. What percent of tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?
Expanded Numeracy Scale
1. Which o f the following numbers represents the biggest risk o f getting a disease? 
 1 in 1 0 0 , ____1 in 1 0 0 0 , ___ 1 in 1 0
2. Which o f the following numbers represents the biggest risk o f getting a disease? 
 1% ,___10%,____ 5%
3. If Person A ’s risk o f getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and person B’s risk is double 
that of A ’s, what is B’s risk?__________
4. If Person A ’s chance o f getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and person B’s risk is 
double that o f A ’s, what is B’s risk?__________
5. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get 
the disease:
A: Out o f 100? _ _ _ _ _
B: Out o f 1000?___________
6 . If  the chance o f getting a disease is 20 out o f 100, this would be the same as having a 
 % chance of getting the disease.
7. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out o f 10,000 people, about how many 
of them are expected to get infected?
APPENDIX F
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Read each o f the following items and decide whether the statement is true or false  as it 
pertains to you personally and mark T or F beside the statement to indicate this.
 1 . 1 sometimes feel resentful when 1 don’t get my way.
 2. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too
little o f my abilities.
 3. There have been times when I feel like rebelling against people in authority
even though I knew they were right.
 4. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.
 5 .1 can remember “playing sick” to get out of something.
 6 . There have been occasions when I took advantage o f someone.
 7. I ’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
 8 . 1 sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
 9.1 am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
 1 0 . 1 have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my
own.
 11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortunes o f others.
 1 2 . 1 am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors o f me.
 13 .1 have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.
APPENDIX G
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Below are 20 hypothetical scenarios that ask you to make a decision based on the 
information provided. Please read each hypothetical scenario carefully and select the 
option that you favor for each scenario. There are no right or wrong answers, so please do 
your best.
Financial Risky Decisions
Imagine that you have $6000 invested in the stock market. A downturn in the economy is 
occurring. You have two investment strategies that have been recommended to you by 
your trusted financial advisor to help preserve your investment.
Strategy A: If strategy A is followed, $2,000 of you investment will be saved and
$4,000.00 will be lost.
Strategy B: If strategy B is followed, there is 30% chance that the entire $6000 will be
saved, and a 70% chance that none o f your investment will be saved.
Which of the two strategies (A or B) do you favor? _____
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
Imagine that you won $1.1 million in the state lottery and have $50,000 in various debts 
(e.g. student loans, car loan, mortgage, credit card, etc.). What would you do with the 
money?
Option A: Invest all of the money into long-term savings plan.
Option B: Pay off all o f your current debts and then spend the rest o f the money
however you choose.
Which of the two options (A or B) do you favor?______
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
Imagine that you won the Lottery for Life, which is a program that is designed to pay 
winners up to $3 million. You have two choices o f how to receive the money.
Option A: Take the $3 million lump sum up front and pay a hefty state tax on this
income.
Option B: Take the payment plan option, where you will receive $25,000 per month
for the next ten years and pay state taxes on the annual earnings.
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Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?
Not at all risky/ 
Not representative 
o f  risk domain
Highly risky/
2 3 4 5 Representative o f
risk domain
Imagine that you are looking to purchase a house and need to decide between two 
attractive options.
Option A: A well maintained house that is approximately 30 minutes away from
your place of work and $20,000 under your budget.
Option B: A brand new house that is approximately 10 minutes away from your
place of work and is $15,000 over your budget.
Which of the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
Imagine that your financial advisor informed you about a potentially lucrative investment 
in an up-and-coming internet technology business. The advisor tells you that this 
company’s stock has been steadily climbing and is projected to yield large gains on all 
investments; however, the stock market is unpredictable and you are not guaranteed to 
make a profit on your investment. The advisor asks if you would like to buy into the 
stock. Assume that you make $50,000 per year at your job. You are presented with two 
buy-in options.
Option A: Invest 5% of your annual income in this stock.
Option B: Invest $1000 in this stock.
Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?  __ _
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
Imagine that you are presented with an attractive all-inclusive 7-day trip to Fiji that costs 
$1,800.00 per person. You really want to go, but cannot afford to pay for the trip out of 
pocket. You have two options that would make this trip feasible.
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Option A: Book the trip and all related expenses (e.g. souvenirs, day trips,
transportation, etc.) on your credit card and pay off the trip and 20% 
monthly interest over the course of a year.
Option B: Take out a small loan from your bank and pay off the trip, related
expenses, and 7% monthly interest over the course o f a year.
Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor? 
Not at all risky/
Not representative 1 2  3 4
o f  risk domain
Highly risky/ 
Representative o f  
risk domain
Imagine that you are looking to purchase a new car and come across two attractive 
options. Car A is a brand new top o f the line model, while car B is also top o f the line, but 
two years old and was returned to the dealership after a lease expired. Assume that you 
have budgeted a maximum of S600 in transportation costs per month. Which car would 
you purchase?
Car A: Costs $600 per month after your down payment.
Car B: Costs $450 per month after your down payment.
Which of the two cars (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/ 
Not representative 
o f  risk domain
1
Highly risky/ 
Representative o f  
risk domain
Imagine that you received $900.00 from your annual tax return and currently hold a 
balance o f $275.00 on your credit card. Aside from the money that you 
owe on your credit card, you are debt-free. What would you do with the 
money?
Option A: Book a $1,200.00 trip to Europe for 10 days, which would require you to
spend an additional $300 plus all related expenses.
Option B: Book a weekend getaway for $300.00, pay the $275.00 balance on your
credit card, and invest the remaining $325.00 in a savings account.
Which of the two options (A or B) do you favor?
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
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Imagine that you were looking to invest $5,000.00 in a mutual fund. Ideally, you would 
like to use the profit as part of a down payment on a planned large purchase in the future 
(i.e. a house, car, boat, etc.). Your financial advisor informs you that there are two 
options.
Option A: A slow growth mutual fund that is guaranteed to yield profit in the long­
term (i.e. after one year).
Option B: A fast growth mutual fund that may yield profit initially (i.e. after one
month) but is not guaranteed to yield long-term profit (i.e. after one year).
Which of the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
Imagine that you are at a casino and have already won $500.00. You’re playing a game 
and are feeling lucky. What do you do on your next turn?
Option A: Go all in on your next bet in hopes o f doubling your earnings.
Option B: Walk away now and keep the $500.00 that you’ve already made
Which of the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
H ealth Risky Decisions
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak o f a lethal viral strain o f H INI swine 
flu, which is expected to kill 6 million people. In the Southern U.S., 250 cases have 
already been identified. Two alternative preventative vaccinations have been proposed.
Vaccine A: The current, standard vaccine yields a 60% chance that all people who
receive this vaccination will become immune to the H1N1 flu. 
Comparatively, there is a 40% chance that all people who receive this 
vaccination will not be immune and will still be susceptible to contracting 
the H1N1 flu.
Vaccine B: A new vaccine has an 80-85% effectiveness rate o f preventing the H1N1
in animals. It has not yet been tested on humans.
Which of the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____
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Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
The National Cancer Institute has made two scientific breakthroughs that allow them to 
reverse a substantial portion o f the cellular changes that lead to all types o f cancer. This 
treatment has the potential to reduce the lethality o f all forms o f cancer; however, it 
cannot be guaranteed that people who develop cancer and receive this treatment will not 
die. The U.S. government is taking a nation-wide poll to determine which treatment the 
public wants to become standard treatment.
Treatment A: This is a new vaccination that has been tested in animals and yields a 55% 
effectiveness rate in treating cancerous cell growth. This vaccination is 
awaiting human testing.
Treatment B: This is a new vaccination that has been tested on animals and yields an 
85% effectiveness rate in treating cancerous cell growth; however, it 
substantially increases the risk o f having a heart attack and has not yet 
been tested on humans.
There are adequate resources to implement only one treatment program. Which o f the 
two treatments (A or B) would you favor for national implementation? _____
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
Imagine that you have contracted a rare and lethal disease and are asked to pick a course 
of treatment. Two treatment options are available.
Treatment A: The current medical treatment yields a 40% success rate.
Treatment B: A new treatment yields a 65% success rate, but has only been tested on a 
small number (50) o f adults in Europe and appeared to lower the 
participants’ immunity such that they were susceptible to other infections 
and illnesses for one year following treatment.
Which of the two treatments (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
Imagine that a major drug company will soon be releasing a new vaccine, which has been
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approved by the Food and Drug Administration, to reduce the chances of contracting and 
spreading Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs). This vaccine has been associated with 
slight reductions in libido across all sexes.
Vaccine A: Decline the vaccination, which may increase your chances o f contracting
an STI, but maintain your current libido.
Vaccine B: Receive the vaccination, which will significantly decrease your chances of
contracting an STI, but may decrease your current libido.
Which of the two vaccines (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
Current research suggests that much of the meat and animal byproducts that make up a 
large proportion o f the American diet are genetically modified, consist o f antibiotics, and 
that these animals are highly susceptible to lethal strains o f E-coli. Moreover, research 
suggests that beef is the most susceptible o f all meats. Research has not yet determined 
the long-term effects o f diets filled with meat and animal byproducts. There are two diet 
programs from which to choose.
Program A: A diet devoid o f all beef products and byproducts.
Program B: Continue to consume meat and animal byproducts as a part o f your regular
diet.
Which o f the two programs (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
The federal government and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are taking swift 
action to reduce the rates o f obesity and health-related concerns that arise from a diet that 
is high in fats, cholesterol, salt, and sugar, which has been referred to as the “fast food 
and pre-processed diet”. The government and FDA have developed two programmed 
approaches to reduce the rates o f obesity and health-related concerns amongst Americans. 
Program A: Close all fast food chains across the country over the next 5 years and
require that all remaining restaurants follow strict food preparation 
guidelines.
Program B: Require that all fast food chains follow strict food preparation guidelines
and continue to allow Americans to choose their diet.
145
Which of the two programs (A or B) do you favor?
Not at all risky/ 
Not representative 
o f  risk domain
Highly risky/
2 3 4 5 Representative o f
risk domain
Imagine that you arrive at the beach on a hot, sunny summer day and realize that you 
have forgotten your sunscreen at home, which is 15 minutes away. The weather network 
advised all people to wear sunscreen if they planned on being in the sun for longer than 
20 minutes. What do you do?
Option A: Drive to the closest store, which is 10 minutes away and purchase some
sunscreen.
Option B: Go to the beach without sunscreen.
Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
Imagine that you are out at a social gathering with your close friend. Both o f you have 
had several alcoholic beverages and your friend insists on driving home, noting that they 
are “Okay to drive”. What do you do?
Option A: Refuse to take a ride home from your friend and call a taxi. The taxi will
charge you $25.00 to drive you home and you know that your friend does
not have money.
Option B: Listen to your friend and accept the ride.
Which of the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f
o f  risk domain risk domain
Imagine that you need $20.00 in the morning and forgot to take it out at the bank while 
you were running your errands during the day. You need to go to an ATM and take out 
cash before you go to bed, but do not have a car and there is no public transportation 
available. Your only option is to walk to the closest ATM. Which route do you take?
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Route A: Consists o f 5 blocks and takes approximately 10 minutes to reach the
closest ATM, but goes through a bad part o f town that is not well lit at 
night.
Route B: Consists of 10 blocks and takes approximately 20 minutes to reach the
same ATM, but goes through the center o f town, which is well lit and 
monitored at night.
Which o f the two routes (A or B) do you favor? 
Not at all risky/
Not representative 1 2  3 4
o f risk domain
Highly risky/ 
Representative o f  
risk domain
Imagine that you get into your car to drive to work in the morning and realize that your 
seatbelt is broken. You try to fix it but are not successful. You cannot miss a day at work 
without losing pay and need the money. What do you do?
Option A: Call a friend to drive you to work, which would possibly make you late,
resulting in a minimal daily pay reduction.
Option B: Drive your car to work without a seatbelt and arrive on time.
Which of the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/ Highly risky/
Not representative 1 2 3 4 5 Representative o f





Below are 11 hypothetical scenarios that ask you to make a decision based on the 
information provided. Please read each hypothetical scenario carefully and select the 
option that you favor for each scenario. There are no right or wrong answers, so please do 
your best.
The National Cancer Institute has made two scientific breakthroughs that allow them to 
reverse a substantial portion of the cellular changes that lead to all types o f cancer. This 
treatment has the potential to reduce the lethality o f all forms of cancer; however, it 
cannot be guaranteed that people who develop cancer and receive this treatment will not 
die. The U.S. government is taking a nation-wide poll to determine which treatment the 
public wants to become standard treatment.
Treatment A: This is a new vaccination that has been tested in animals and yields a 55% 
effectiveness rate in treating cancerous cell growth. This vaccination is 
awaiting human testing.
Treatment B: This is a new vaccination that has been tested on animals and yields an 
85% effectiveness rate in treating cancerous cell growth; however, it 
substantially increases the risk o f having a heart attack and has not yet 
been tested on humans.
There are adequate resources to implement only one treatment program. Which o f the 
two treatments (A or B) would you favor for national implementation? _____
Imagine that you have $6000 invested in the stock market. A downturn in the economy is 
occurring. You have two investment strategies that have been recommended to you by 
your trusted financial advisor to help preserve your investment.
Strategy A: If strategy A is followed, $2,000 of you investment will be saved and
$4,000.00 will be lost.
Strategy B: If strategy B is followed, there is 30% chance that the entire $6000 will be
saved, and a 70% chance that none o f your investment will be saved.
Which of the two strategies (A or B) do you favor? _____
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak o f a lethal viral strain o f H INI swine 
flu, which is expected to kill 6 million people. In the Southern U.S., 250 cases have 
already been identified. Two alternative preventative vaccinations have been proposed.
Vaccine A: The current, standard vaccine yields a 60% chance that all people who
receive this vaccination will become immune to the H1N1 flu. 
Comparatively, there is a 40% chance that all people who receive this 
vaccination will not be immune and will still be susceptible to contracting 
the H1N1 flu.
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Vaccine B: A new vaccine has an 80-85% effectiveness rate o f preventing the H1N1
in animals. It has not yet been tested on humans.
Which o f the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____
Imagine that you won the Lottery for Life, which is a program that is designed to pay 
winners up to $3 million. You have two choices o f how to receive the money.
Option A: Take the $3 million lump sum up front and pay a hefty state tax on this
income.
Option B: Take the payment plan option, where you will receive $25,000 per month
for the next ten years and pay state taxes on the annual earnings.
Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that you have contracted a rare and lethal disease and are asked to pick a course 
o f treatment. Two treatment options are available.
Treatment A: The current medical treatment yields a 40% success rate.
Treatment B: A new treatment yields a 65% success rate, but has only been tested on a 
small number (50) o f adults in Europe and appeared to lower the 
participants’ immunity such that they were susceptible to other infections 
and illnesses for one year following treatment.
Which o f the two treatments (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that you are at a casino and have already won $500.00. You’re playing a game 
and are feeling lucky. What do you do on your next turn?
Option A: Go all in on your next bet in hopes o f doubling your earnings.
Option B: Walk away now and keep the $500.00 that you’ve already made.
Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that you arrive at the beach on a hot, sunny summer day and realize that you 
have forgotten your sunscreen at home, which is 15 minutes away. The weather network 
advised all people to wear sunscreen if they planned on being in the sun for longer than 
20 minutes. What do you do?
Option A: Drive to the closest store, which is 10 minutes away and purchase some
sunscreen.
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Option B: Go to the beach without sunscreen.
Which of the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that you were looking to invest $5,000.00 in a mutual fund. Ideally, you would 
like to use the profit as part of a down payment on a planned large purchase in the future 
(i.e. a house, car, boat, etc.). Your financial advisor informs you that there are two 
options.
Option A: A slow growth mutual fund that is guaranteed to yield profit in the long­
term (i.e. after one year).
Option B: A fast growth mutual fund that may yield profit initially (i.e. after one
month) but is not guaranteed to yield long-term profit (i.e. after one year).
Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that you are out at a social gathering with your close friend. Both o f you have 
had several alcoholic beverages and your friend insists on driving home, noting that 
he/she are “Okay to drive”. What do you do?
Option A: Refuse to take a ride home from your friend and call a taxi. The taxi will
charge you $25.00 to drive you home and you know that your friend does 
not have money.
Option B: Listen to your friend and accept the ride.
Which of the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that your financial advisor informed you about a potentially lucrative investment 
in an up-and-coming internet technology business. The advisor tells you that this 
company’s stock has been steadily climbing and is projected to yield large gains on all 
investments; however, the stock market is unpredictable and you are not guaranteed to 
make a profit on your investment. The advisor asks if you would like to buy into the 
stock. Assume that you make $50,000 per year at your job. You are presented with two 
buy-in options.
Option A: Invest 5% of your annual income in this stock.
Option B: Invest $ 1000 in this stock.
Which of the two options (A or B) do you favor?  ____
Imagine that you need $20.00 in the morning and forgot to take it out at the bank while 
you were running your errands during the day. You need to go to an ATM and take out
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cash before you go to bed, but do not have a car and there is no public transportation 
available. Your only option is to walk to the closest ATM. Which route do you take?
Route A: Consists of 5 blocks and takes approximately 10 minutes to reach the
closest ATM, but goes through a bad part of town that is not well lit at 
night.
Route B: Consists o f 10 blocks and takes approximately 20 minutes to reach the
same ATM, but goes through the center o f town, which is well lit and 
monitored at night.





“Welcome and thank you for participating in the study “Personal Factors, 
Domain Specificity, and Risky Decision-Making”. My name is Rose Niles/ [say your 
name] and I am a research assistant o f Rose Niles, the primary investigator of this study. 
In order to participate, you must be between the ages o f 18-89 years and you must 
provide written informed consent. Please take a moment and read this consent form, as it 
contains important information about this study”.
“You will notice that there are two identical consent forms in your survey packet, 
one labeled Participant Copy and one labeled Investigator Copy. If you would like to 
participate, please make an X in the box labeled Accept on both copies of this consent 
form. Please remove the Participant Copy and keep it with your personal records. If your 
instructor is offering extra course credit, the Participant Copy o f the Informed Consent 
form may be used as proof o f participation. If you do not wish to participate, please 
return your survey packet to me and you can leave”.
“Today you will be completing a survey packet and asked to do a number o f 
things. Please answer every test item honestly and to the best o f your ability. We will 
begin with two timed tests and then you will be given unlimited time to finish the 
remaining test items. Please take a moment to silence or turn off your cell phones before 
we begin. Please do not use your cell phone or other electronic devices, including 





Per the test administration guidelines, all participants will be introduced to the 
Shipley-2 via these instructions: “You will be taking two brief tests today. Please try as 
hard as you can on each one and pay attention to when I tell you to begin and to stop. 
Each of the tests has its own instructions. When I tell you to start, read the instructions 
carefully and then start working on the test” (Shipley et al., 2009, p.6).
Introduction to Vocabulary Test on the Shipley-2
Per the test administration guidelines, all participants will be introduced to the 
Vocabulary test of the Shipley-2 via these instructions: “This task is about word 
meanings. Ready? Read the instructions and begin” (Shipley et al., 2009, p. 6). After ten 
minutes have elapsed, participants will be told to put their pencils down and stop 
working.
Per the test administration guidelines, all participants will be introduced to the 
Block Design test o f the Shipley-2 via these instructions: “The next task shows some 
block patterns to figure out. It is on two pages that face each other. You can do both 
pages without stopping. Open the form, read the instructions, and begin” (Shipley et al., 
2009, p.6). After ten minutes have elapsed, the participants will be instructed to put their 
pencils down and stop working.
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